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2 COLUMNS 
MARGINS 
The Burden of 
History 
History is the key to liberation. His-
tory is an insufferable burden. 
Which one do you choose? That has 
been the essential choice facing the 
Labor movement since the election 
of the Hawke government eight 
years ago. The fabric of the Labor 
Party has been stretched in every 
direction as its parliamentarians 
have headed off this way, while the 
rank-and-file has gone another. 
Business and respectability have be-
ckoned; ordinary suburban and 
provincial workers have appealed, 
but less so. 
At the centre of the torment has been 
the uncertainty about what the Labor 
Party should stand for when it is in 
office, and this has been the nature of 
the debate within the Left from the 
mid-80s onwards. But it is possible 
that the real question the ALP needs 
to ask itself is one that confronts 
deeper, darker concerns, matters that 
go to the very raison d' etre of the 
party. Is it relevant at all? 
There seems to be some evidence that 
the Labor Party has steadily lost its 
r.elevance to our broader society 
during the past 15 years. One of the 
most potent examples of this is the 
urban infrastructure issue: first, the 
difficulty with which the Left, and 
more particularly Brian Howe, has 
been faced in trying to make urban 
infrastructure a key Labor issue; and, 
second, Labor's self-delusion in 
thinking that the adoption of the issue 
now is proof that it is in touch with 
what is actually going on out there. 
The chronic problems of the outer 
suburbs have plagued our cities-
and for 'our cities' read the people 
who live there, the welfare system 
that must service the place, the in-
dustries that do and don't establish 
themselves there-for up to 30 years. 
The suburban sprawl is an integral 
partofourpost-war culture. Whitlam 
recognised this in the late 60s, 
launched the 1972 election campaign 
at Blacktown and implemented 
policies aimed at providing services 
in developing metropolitan areas. But 
when Kerr sacked him, the ALP lost 
interest in this fundamental issue and 
it took 15 years to rediscover it. Why? 
How could such a thing go missing in 
a party that purports-wrongly-to 
be mass-based? Should the ordinary 
working men and women, with their 
new families and their massive 
mortgages and their fear of un-
employment, have formed a lobby 
group and paid a bunch of suits to 
make representations to the nabobs of 
the ALP on their behalf? 
The modem Australian society sits 
very uncomfortably with the institu-
tions that underpin the Labor move-
ment: the trade unions and the 
various state branches of the ALP. Or-
ganisationally, the movement still 
reflects a post-colonial society that 
took refuge in suburbanisation after 
many grim decades as a social and 
economic frontier. The Labor Party 
and the unions are founded on no-
tions of struggle and self-improve-
ment, notions that suited that early 
20th century framework. They were 
established as vanguards of action by 
and for ordinary people; the key to 
their success was that people had to 
not only get involved but want to get 
involved. 
Those fundamental suppositions are 
notnativetothegreatmassofmodern 
Australians. In the information age, 
there is very much a 'fee for service' 
attitude towards political action. 
Australians expect direct, tangible 
benefits for their efforts. Many impor-
tant aspects of life nowadays dis-
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courage enfranchisement; physical, 
emotional and spiritual disconnec-
tion is a strong feature of the suburban 
lifestyle. 
The example of consumer goods 
helps to make the point. For the 
average suburban working family, an 
important goal is the acquisition of a 
substantial quantity and variety of 
sound and video equipment and 
whitegoods. In the past 15 years, these 
(mostly imported) goods have be-
come inexpensive, in relative terms, 
and are within reach of most income 
earners. 
The ALP and the ACIU have con-
centrated their efforts-although 
many critics say, with not enough 
vigour-on enabling people to have 
enough income to obtain these goods. 
But that is all, and it is only half of the 
task. Labor has paid little regard to 
how such consumerism and themes-
sages and stimuli contained in the 
newly-established home entertain· 
ment centres have been gradually 
transforming the Australian people 
and their ideas of social responsibility. 
This is a society of watchers, not 
doers. Labor Party and union mem-
bership has fallen because out beyond 
the freeway's outer reaches you feel 
like you've been done over by politi-
cal institutions that don't feel for you 
any more. If you' re going to join 
something, make it something you'll 
enjoy, like the footy club, or some-
thing that can produce results you can 
see, like a local conservation group. 
For the Labor Party, the way ahead is 
not a matter of marketing or reor-
ganisation. It is a matter of its activists 
and parliamentarians watching what 
people watch, reading what people 
read, waitingforthebusrouteand the 
child-care centre to come to their 
neighbourhood, being frightened of 
the things that frighten them. A proud 
history of struggle is all very well but 
it's no help when you're stuck in the 
peak-hour traffic every morning. 
SHAUN CARNEY ia a rolUDUlist for 1'111 
Age. 
PROFILE 
Collette 
When British dance music artist 
Betty Boo was caught miming and 
harassed off stage by jeering punters 
Ina Melbourne club in July, Collette 
Roberta might have had a feeling of 
dlja ou. 
1\vo years earlier, Collette herself suf-
fered the same rejection when she 
supported American rap star Tone 
Loc at a Sydney show-though 
whether she was really miming or not 
was never established. Betty Boo 
blamed stress and overwork for the 
enforced cancellation of the rest of her 
Australian tour; Collette, with 
nowhere to flee to but her modest 
Sydney terrace, blamed "bad sound" 
and soldiered on. 
Collette Roberts, 24, came to Australia 
from New Zealand in her late teens; 
she was a successful model, starring 
in many a supermarket sale catalogue 
before turning her attention towards 
the world of music. 
Collette entered the pop world on the 
tail-end of the Kylie Minogue back-
lash and, despite the success of her 
first single "Ring My Bell", soon 
found the pent-up indignation of rock 
hacks diverted her way. 
Collette's image was 'fun'; she 
seemed like a young mother figure, or 
an au pair perhaps. Long blonde hair 
and cycling shorts; that was the look. 
She wrote the words to all the songs 
but one on her first album &lise the 
Roof, and we presume her col-
laborator, Sydney OJ Pee Wee Ferris, 
didn't mind when she implied they 
were all her own work. 
It didn't do any good; Collette was 
consigned to the bimbo drawer from 
the start. Newspapers and even pop 
magazines never took her seriously. It 
suited her detractors to categorise 
Collette as a hugely successful mind-
less ex-model with no talent 
It was time for a re-think-always dif-
ficult in a market which rarely allows 
a second chance, especially for the 
lightweights. Midway through 1990, 
Collette took the plunge and went 
'street smart'. She cut her hair short 
and donned a velvet jumpsuit for 
'Who Do You Think You Are?"-
probably her best track to date. The 
song announced her new approach 
with a gritty video and chorus of 
"Who do you think you're foolin'?" It 
was as good and as opinionated as 
anything megastar Janet Jackson 
could manage, and Collette an-
nounced that it was about the critics 
who'd panned her in the past and 
who were about to get their comeup-
pance. 
But the damage to her career was al-
ready done, and neither the single nor 
the new album, Attitude, sold in any 
great quantity here. 
Collette is unrepentant, and 
nowadays looks to foreign markets-
particularly in Asia-for her music. 
But while she persists in the struggle, 
it is interesting to reflect on just why 
Collette's commercial success has 
been, well, not much of a success, 
especially considering the excitement 
generated by other young Australian 
female dance stars like Dannii, Tma 
Arena and Melissa. 
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Firstly, I think it's the look. Collette is 
self-assured and, though her videos 
have always been light-hearted af-
fairs, there is nothing fluffy or cute 
about her. Secondly, there is the con-
tent. The Attitude LP took a more 
hardline approach lyrically but Col-
lette has never been about sex, or even 
love, very much. To an average teen 
consumer, Dannii and Tina Arena 
really do have a sexy, little-girl 
quality. The sexiness gives credibility 
and interest; the girlishness makes it 
non-threatening. Their songs, too, 
have an air of anguish about them 
which makes them somehow 
'feminine'. 
Thirdly, she has an attitude problem. 
Collette is more concerned with her 
music than anything else; she takes, 
you feel, no little pride in her work. 
But because she seems to feel com-
pelled to present herself as a face, a 
figure, an image, she is less eager to 
show us this serious or creative side--
though she will readily say that she's 
now writing (read: co-writing) songs 
for other people. 
In August, 14 top forty singles in the 
Australian charts featured women's 
voices singing le«d vocal-as well as 
two male/female duets. Only four of 
the top twenty albums, on the other 
hand, are by women. The majority of 
these women aren't writing their own 
songs-though, unlike most male 
singers (who don't have to worry 
much about such things), most of 
them are taking responsibility for 
their own 'look'. 
If Collette is to be singled out from all 
female pop stars as the 
'manufactured' one, then the obvious 
should be stated: there isn't one artist 
in pop music today who doesn't rely 
on an image to help sell records; there 
probably hasn't been one in thirty 
years. ('Not having an image' is one 
of the most powerful 'images' 
around, of course.) Subjective evalua-
tion of Collette's career gets harder by 
the day, especially since, with At-
titude, she's joined the argument her-
self. But I, for one, am on her side. 
DAVID NICHOLS writes for teen 
magazines. 
4 BRIEFINGS 
Grand Illusions 
Five months ago the ACI'U leadership embarked on a 
very risky course by leaping into a wage campaign in 
the middle of a deep recession. It had just turned its 
back on a national wage decision in which the 
Industrial Relations Commission was prepared to 
allow a 2.5% per cent pay rise. 
The new campaign, which was a direct 
assault on the authority of the 
Commissions's centralised wage-
fixing system, was undertaken at a 
time when the bargaining power of 
organisedlabourwasatitslowest. The 
AC'IU' s secretary, Bill Kelty, neverthe-
less rallied support at a national union 
conference in Melbourne for bypass-
ing the Commission and seeking 
direct negotiations with employers 
based on Accord Mark VI claims 
which the wage decision in April had 
either rejected or deferred until 
November. 
Kelty admitted the campaign might 
take time, but he vowed to fight to the 
last ounce of his energy. Unions, he 
warned, were either "init,oroutofit". 
The unstated penalty for breaching 
union solidarity was isolation -per-
The terrible twins in conference. 
haps forever. So intense was Kelty's 
public animosity towards the Com-
mission that he described its decision 
as "vomit" which unions did not in-
tend to eat. He later told one 
newspaper interviewer that he could 
havenorespectforanyperson who sat 
on the wage bench. In another inter-
view, he compared the Commission's 
president, Justice Barry Maddem, to 
Fidel Castro. 
Kelty's stand was reinforced by sup-
port he received from the federal 
government, and in particul~ ~y ,a 
blistering attack on the Comm~ss1on s 
credibility by his ally and friend, then 
Treasurer Paul Keating. Both men 
were irritated that the Commission 
had rebuffed the Accord Mark VI deal 
negotiated in the leadup to the 1990 
election. The Commission's cardinal 
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sin, according to Keating, was its 
failure to respond to Australia's 
changing economy. Instead of accept-
ing the Accord's model of 
decentralised enterprise bargaining, 
the Commission was supposed, ac-
cording to Keating, to have said: "Oh 
no, let's have a trip back down the 
time tunnel to a rigid centralised sys-
tem where we sit above everyone 
else." 
In late June, two months into the fight, 
a confident Kelty told an assembled 
gathering of reporters that the 
ACIU's wage campaign against the 
1991 national wage decision was nJ?· 
ning "precisely to plan." B~t was.1t? 
By mid-August all the maJOr uruon 
sectors upon which the ACIU hoped 
to rely - including road transport, 
building, waterfront, banking, metals 
and even the Commonwealth public 
sector-had returned to the Commis-
sion. They accepted a 2.5 per cent pay 
rise in line with the national wage 
decision and gave commitments as 
sought by the bench, with some minor 
fiddling on detail, to make no extra 
claims until November 1. H there had 
been a strategy behind the ACIU cam-
paign in the first place, the difficulty 
now was identifying what it was. 
The lack of a clear strategy is what sets 
apart this ACIU campaign from its 
predecessors. Kelty, a gifted strategist 
who has generally served the trade 
union movement well in his eight 
years as ACIU secretary, slipped up. 
His main problem appears to have 
been the bewildering array of agendas 
he has had to juggle and which, over 
time, have complicated his life and 
tom his loyalties. 
One theme which keeps bobbing up Is 
Kelty's role (mainly behind the 
scenes) in trying to help Keating in his 
attempt to topple Bob Hawke and win 
the prime ministership. A number ol 
union leaders believe Kelty's pro-
I<eating sympathies explain the spon· 
ing role he played at certain stages of 
the wages campaign after April whea 
he tried to frustrate their unions' 
settlements in the Commission. 
point, they say, was not just to 
life difficult for the Commission; 
also wanted to cloud the political en-
vironment for Hawke. 
Another key to Kelty's behaviour is 
his apparent attempt to prepare the 
union movement for a potentially dif-
ficult future under a liberal-National 
government. Kelty is doing his best to 
help keep labor in office (something 
which has also often undermined his 
allegiance to his union constituency, 
10 far as his support for reduced real 
wages and higher interest rates is con-
cerned). But he knows what might lie 
ahead. The Coalition's industrial rela-
tions spokesperson, John Howard, 
means business when he talks about 
brealcing union power and replacing 
award structures with employer-
employee enterprise agreements. 
Howard, not the Commission, is 
Kelty's real enemy. But Kelty wants to 
prepare unions for a possible fight 
ahead when they may not be able to 
rely on the Commission for support. 
His big problem is that unions are not 
responding to the call in a recession. 
Indeed, irifluential figures such as 
Peter Sams of the NSW Labor Coundl 
believe Kelty has taken entirely the 
wrong approach. Sams rontends that 
unions need the centralised wages 
system when faced with a hostile con-
1. The AC'IU asked for a flat $12 rise 
for all workers. The bench converted 
this into a 25 percent pay rise, which 
is roughly equivalent to $12 for an 
average wage earner. The bench ar-
gued that a percentage increase 
made more sense because it followed 
a realignment of award relativities 
previously requested by the AC1U. 
A flat-dollar increase would have 
compressed the same relativities 
which the AC1U had sought to fix. 
The ACI'U argued that the low-paid 
would fare poorly without a flat dol-
lar increase. The bench dismissed 
this, declaring that low income 
earners would be looked after by a 
separate round of minimum rate 
award increases. 
2. The AC'IU asked for a staged dou-
bling of award-based superannua-
tion rontributions to 6 percent by 
1993. The bench did not reject this 
outright. Rather, it argued that 
problems existed in the present sys-
tem. It recommended that the future 
servative government, and hence that 
denigrating the Commission now is 
counterproductive. 
For more than a year now, Kelty has 
waged a bitter feud against the Com-
mission, a feud which ·seems to be 
based on genuine animus over its 
decision-making and a dispute over 
bench salary levels. But union critics 
also claim he appears to have 'set up' 
the Commission so that the ACI'U 
rould reject its national wage decision. 
In one sense, the ACI'U probably had 
to reject the decision. How could it live 
down the ignominy of receiving such 
a romprehensive rebuff to the Acrord 
for the first time in its eight-year his-
tory? Kelty's problem was that the 
fight became devoid of logic. The 
ACI'U leadership misrepresented the 
wage decision and turned its attack 
into personal abuse of Commission 
members to try to justify the unjustifi-
able. 
Without first testing the decision, 
Kelty claimed that it required unions 
to make too many roncessions to gain 
a meagre 2.5 percent wage rise. And in 
one of his harshest attack:., he claimed 
the Commission had deserted the 
low-paid in rejecting the ACfU's flat 
The April Wage Decision 
of award superannuation, and the 
formulation of an overall retirement 
income policy, be sorted out first by 
a ronference ronvened by the federal 
government. 
3. The AC'IU asked the Commission 
to dispense with rules which had 
prohibited unions from making 
claims outside the centralised system 
after giving a 'no extra claims' com-
mitment. The ACTU wanted to add 
decentralised wage bargaining at 
enterprise level to the existing award 
system. This was partly motivated 
by the intent to steal the thunder of 
Coalition industrial relations policy, 
and partly by a genuine attempt to 
devolve the wage system and release 
some unions from their eight-year 
Accord strailjacket. The ACfU ar-
gued that unions be free to make 
over-award claims based on produc-
tivity improvements and 
profitability, and that over-award 
payments were the best way to ron-
trot wage outcomes and avoid 
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$12 claim in favour of a percentage 
increase. Here he ignored the 
Commission's explanation and in-
stead personalised his attack by point-
ing out that Commission members 
themselves stood to gain a fat pay rise 
by opting for a percentage rather than 
a flat rise. 
Nowhere in Kelty's rhetoric did he 
acknowledge that his strategy - a 
wage campaign conducted on the 
scorched earth of a recession-would 
likewise mean deserting the low-paid 
and weak bargainers among ACI'U 
affiliates, many of whom would end 
up with nothing. And amid his bar-
rage of attacks on the Commission, he 
conveniently overlooked that the Ac-
cord agreements he had negotiated 
with Keating since 1983 had or-
chestrated a fall in real wages of at 
least ten percent for the ACfU' s same 
low-paid constituency. 
Two years ago Australia' s domestic 
pilots were the bad boys of the 
centrali~ed wage-fixing system for 
daring to step outside it and seek 
negotiations over their admittedly 
outrageous 30 percent pay claim. 
Now the ACI'U has to contemplate 
the consequences of rejecting the same 
system. 
widespread flow-ons. The Commis-
sion initially warmed to the idea. A 
problem arose when the Metal 
Trades Industry Association (MTIA) 
categorically rejected over-award 
payments because of strong fears of 
wage flow-ons, based on past ex-
perience. It wanted all payments to 
be somehow included within metal 
industry awards. In a compromise, 
the ACTU accommodated the 
MTIA's position - but this meant 
tacitly supporting conflicting argu-
ments about the conduct of 
enterprise bargaining. The bench did 
not reject enterprise bargaining, but 
said the arguments put were conflict-
ing and vague. It appeared con-
cerned that wage outcomes in a 
decentralised system might run out 
of control once the economy 
recovered, and asked all sides to re-
examine their proposals and resub-
mit them for a new decision on 
enterprise bargaining which it 
proposed to deliver by early Novem-
ber. 
6 BRIEFINGS 
The ACIU's wages policy is a key 
issue to be debated at its supreme 
policy-making body, the ACfU bien-
nial congress, in Melbourne this 
month. If they have the courage, 
unions will challenge the way Kelty 
oonducted the ACIU's unsuccessful 
wage campaign. Even if they don't, 
and public debate is minimised for the 
sake of unity, they will set official 
policy for the future. 
The ACfU's behaviour since April 
suggests that reliance on national 
wage cases to deliver general pay rises 
may be a thing of the past. But the 
Right and Left of the union movement 
have joined in supporting future na-
tional wage cases and general pay ad-
justments linked to prices - not just 
enterprise- or industry-level claims 
linked to productivity as Kelty has in-
timated. 
Unions also appear to be oonforming 
to the timetable set by the Commission 
for reviewing the April wage decision 
this month. The oommission is due to 
use a metal industry pay deal as the 
basis for reoonsidering how enterprise 
bargaining might operate in a 
centralised wage system. 
The Commission has also asked the 
ACfU to address the question of what 
role exists for centralised wage-fixing. 
The question now seems to have been 
answered. 
BRAD NORINCTON 1• the Sytl"'f 
Morning HeraUl'alndustrlal editor. 
After lnkathagate 
The recent media revelations about the funding of 
Inkatha forces by De Klerk's National Party 
government should come as no surprise to anyone 
who has studied South Africa's recent history. From 
its formation in 1975 by Chief Mangosuthu Gatsha 
Buthelezi, Inkatha relied upon two 
government-sponsored platforms from which to 
launch its rise to international prominence. The first 
was the so-called homeland of Kwa Zulu where 
Buthelezi was made Chief Minister. By allowing 
Inkatha to engage openly in national politics, free 
from state harassment, while leading resistance 
movements like the African National Congress (ANO 
and Black Consciousness were banned, the 
government provided Inkatha with an almost 
exclusive second platform. 
Many critics describe Inkathaas 'petty 
bourgeois' because it advances the 
eoonomic interests and ideology of the 
traders, civil servants and bureaucrats 
of the Kwa Zulu 'homeland'. In order 
to hold onto its power and privilege 
Inlcatha has been forced to collaborate 
with the white minority government 
which controls the resources and 
holds ultimate authority over the 
'homelands'. Inkatha's activities 
plainly work against the long-term in-
terests of black workers. Despite this 
they have managed to form a popular 
alliance of various classes in the Natal-
Kwa Zulu r~on. 
Inkatha has used all the resources that 
the white minority government 
provides for Kwa Zulu in order to 
marshal its support. Joining Inkatha 
provides access to jobs, services and 
facilities in Kwa Zulu. There have 
been reports of teachers and public 
servants being forced to join in order 
to obtain employment in the Kwa 
Zulu bureaucracy and of students 
being forced to join the party's Youth 
Brigade before they were enrolled in 
school. It has been suggested that 
much of Inkatha's support from 
among black workers living outside 
Kwa Zulu in the 'white' areas is 
derived from migrant workers, who 
rely upon the Inkatha-controlled Kwa 
Zulu bureaucracy for land allocation, 
old age security and the other benefits 
that their families living in the 
'homeland' receive. 
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To maintain its multi-class appeal the 
Kwa Zulu bureaucracy has sought to 
idealise its motives and minimise the 
appearance of self-interest in its rise to 
power and prestige. To serve these 
ends Inkatha's activities have been 
portrayed as an attempt to retrieve the 
dignities and glories that the Zulu 
people have lost. The resources and 
authority of the 'homeland' have been 
used to promote a form of Zulu ethnic 
nationalism. 
While the promotion of Zulu ethnic 
identity served Inkatha's interests, it 
simultaneously supported the apart· 
heid regime's strategies of divide and 
rule. The now discarded policies of 
'separate development' demanded 
that blacks regard themselves u 
members of 'ethnic homelands' rather 
than citizens of South Africa. 
lnkatha's ethnic nationalism runs 
directly contrary to the aims of other 
black liberation movements which 
place primacy upon the unity of 
Africans as an essential oonditions for 
liberation. Through the selective use 
of the history of his clan and some 
plain invention, Buthelezi has sought 
to portray himself as an hereditary 
Zulu prince, rather than the appointee 
of the apartheid regime that his critics 
claim him to be. 
Inkatha has manipulated the material 
insecurities and frustrations of the im-
poverished Kwa Zulu peasants and 
migrant workers by appealing to old 
ethnic bonds. lnkatha ideologuee 
have explained Zulu unemployment 
;Ddlackof facilities by blaming mem-'*' of other ethnic groups who, they 
••y, take jobs and housing which 
lbould belong to Zulu workers. 
IDbtha's politically separatist stance 
II best demonstrated by the activities 
of the United Workers of South Africa 
(UWUSA). This so-called trade union 
was launched by Inlcatha in May 1986. 
It eoon set about helping company 
le(Urity and the South African 
Defence Forces smash the power of 
the National Union of Mineworkers 
(NUM) at mines in northern Natal. 
UWUSA supporters murdered NUM 
orpnisers and used llSsegtUJis to help 
IICUrity forces attack striking miners. 
At mines where NUM organisation 
Wll destroyed UWUSA members 
took over and adopted 'no strike' 
polldes. Zulu symbols have been used 
to mobilise support and 'traditional' 
weapons used in such attaclcs. How-
ever, to describe UWUSA's activities 
u 'tribal conflict', as most of the 
western media has done, is obviously 
inadequate. 
Buthelezi claims to be committed to 
the liberation of South Africa. Inlcatha 
has directed the hostilities of Kwa 
Zulu's impoverished underclass 
away from the apartheid regime and 
has frequently encouraged them to at-
tack those carrying out consumer and 
rent boycotts, strikes and other forms 
of resistance. 
The recent Inkathagate revelations 
have served to bring to wider atten-
tion the complicity that has existed 
between Inlcatha and the apartheid 
regime since the party's formation in 
1975. Jn a system where people have 
been denied virtually all rights of 
citizenship on the grounds of skin 
colour, no black leader can become 
entangled as closely with the govern-
ment as Buthelezi has been and expect 
to retain their credibility with the 
black majority. 
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The ANC will no doubt exploit these 
revelations as a means of destroying 
Buthelezi's claims that he has been a 
legitimate opponent of the apartheid 
regime. However, the history of In-
katha serves to highlight an enormous 
problem which must be faced by post-
apartheid South Africa-the fate of 
the millions of unemployed and land-
hungry peasants. Those blacks who 
gain the eronomic benefits that politi-
cal power and labour rights will bring 
in a non-racial capitalist system can-
not afford to ignore the plight of this 
under-class-for, as recent history has 
demonstrated, they are ripe for 
manipulation by unscrupulous 
demagogues. South Africa's troubles 
will not be over until their problems 
have been addressed. 
JAMES SHUTnEWORm Ia a research 
student in hiatory at the Univerelty of 
Western Australia. 
Back on the Rails 
The decision of federal Cabinet in August not to 
provide special tax breaks for the Very Fast Train 
(VFf) proposal has halted the project in its tracks. 
Following the Cabinet decision, BHP-the last of the 
original four VFT consortium partners-announced 
the suspension of further feasibility studies. 
The project may get a second wind if 
the Premiers' Conference in Novem-
ber agrees to restructure the tax sys-
tem to provide a more concessionary 
tax structure for rompanies formed to 
develop infrastructure privately. Jn 
the meantime, the suspension of work 
on the VFr proposal provides an op-
portunity to review the contentious 
debate over the options for high speed 
rail travel in the Sydney /Melbourne 
corridor. 
Currently, train travel in the corridor 
ocrurs on a steam-age alignment char-
acterised by hundreds of tight curves, 
steep gradients, low tunnel and bridge 
deaiaitces and therefore slow transit 
times. Jn addition, the principal inter-
mediate city in the corridor-Canber-
ra-is only linlced to the main line by 
a meandering branch line which has 
previously been ronsidered a target 
for closure by its owner, the NSW 
government. 
In rontrast, the road infrastructure in 
the Sydney /Melbourne rorridor has 
been fully funded by the federal 
government since 1974 and 
reconstructed to a four-lane dual car-
riageway standard. This, the 
deregulation of the airlines and the 
rontinued neglect of the rail main line 
between Sydney and Melbourne have 
eroded rail freight's share of tonnage 
in the rorridor in the last 25 years, and 
rail's share of the passenger market 
has declined from 15% to 3% in the 
same period. 
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It is against this background that the 
various competing proposals for rail-
way revitalisation have been put for-
ward. The VFr proposal-by far the 
most publicised-would accom-
modate up to 40 passenger trains each 
way per day, with express transit 
times of one hour between Sydney 
and Canberra and three hours be-
tween Sydney and Melbourne. 
But the VFr was controversial from 
the start. From an eronomic perspec-
tive it is unquestionably a high risk 
project: expenditure of $6.5 billion 
over seven years would be required 
before the first dollar of in rome would 
be received. A related and perhaps 
more important concern is whether 
the VFr represents the best allocation 
of resources for infrastructure in the 
rorridor. 
The VFr has never been intended to 
aa:ommodate freight in the corridor 
other than for low tonnage/high 
value air freight and a small quantity 
of overnight road express. The need 
for a high quality rail freight service on 
8 BRIEFINGS 
the existing raU corridor will remain. 
It seems extremely doubtful that any 
government could justify a high speed 
passenger line and a separate high 
speed freight line between Sydney 
and Melbourne-the railway 
equivalent of building two Hume 
Highways. The VFf is not without 
competitors. One of the most 
prominent, the Fast Freight Train 
(FFT) proposal, was developed by 
consultants to VLine (the Victorian 
railways) in 1989. The proposal is 
aimed at transferring freight from 
road to rail through minor track 
realignments and the purchase of 
modem rolling stock. The FFT would 
reduce transit time between Mel-
bourne and Sydney to nine hours and 
XPT passenger transit time to 7.5 
hours. 
Among the advantages of the FFT 
proposal are its relatively low cost and 
its benefits to both rail freight and pas-
senger services. However, the 
economic justification for the proposal 
(which does not directly link the 
nation's capital) is critically depend-
ent on achieving door to door transit 
times between Sydney and Melbourne 
which are competitive with road 
transport In the existing FFT proposal 
there is absolutely no margin for 
delays--which is both unrealistic and, 
at the same time, vital to achieving its 
ambitions. 
Another competitor-the Tilt Train 
proposal advanced by the NSW State 
Rail Authority (SRA) in 1990-is 
designed to offset centrifugal force so 
that a train can travel through smaller 
radius curves with greater passenger 
comfort at higher speeds than conven-
tional trains. Using XPr cars, a tilting 
train has the capacity to reduce pas-
senger transit times on the existing rail 
alignment between Sydney and Mel-
bourne to nine hours. However, the 
self-steering bogies of the T11 t Train are 
not designed to manage the substan-
tial weight differential between empty 
and loaded freight wagons, so a sig-
nificant disadvantage of T1.lt Trains at 
present is that they are not suitable for 
freight transport. 
The final contender is the High Speed 
Rail proposal (HSR) developed by 
Jacana Consulting for the NSW Labor 
Council rail unions in March 1991. The 
HSR builds on the advantages of pre-
vious proposals-and, most impor· 
tantly, addresses their weaknesses. 
Rattled 
Tweedledum and Tweedledee 
Agreed to have a batUe 
For Tweedledum said Tweedledee 
Had spoiled his nice new ratUe. 
We have the makings of a Jeffrey Ar· 
cher political potboiler right on our 
doorstep. The central characters are 
~o working class boys made good. 
Both have always had a longing for 
the big end of town. 
Each regards the prime ministership 
as a prize unwon. Despite appearing 
to be economic whiz-kids they have 
used the same grasp over economics 
as a Machiavellian tool to come within 
a hair's breadth of winning the prize. 
Both are fastidious in dress and style 
but it would be a mistake to regard 
Lewis Carroll, 
Through the Looking Glass. 
either as a dandy-they are hard men, 
made for politics. 
The identity of these two characters is 
none other than Paul Keating and 
John Hewson. Everyone knows that 
the main event in parliament these 
days is the verbal jousting between 
the two, usually over the economic 
competency of either. Each, through 
public posturing, is trying to seize the 
economic agenda for the nation's fu-
ture. Hewson parades the country 
with his consumption tax, Keating 
with his revamped superannuation 
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The proposal aims to reduce journey 
times for both rail freight and pas-
senger services in order to capture 
markets from road as well as from air. 
At the end of a three-stage, ten-year 
upgrading and extension process, rail 
passenger transit times would be 
reduced to five to 5.5 hours between 
Sydney and Melbourne via Canberra 
with freight transit times reduced to 
seven hours. The staging options in 
the proposal are designed to minimise 
risk exposure to large scale capital bor· 
rowings,and toensurethatnoneofthe 
capital works would interfere with rail 
operations. 
The capital cost of the HSR ($3.7 bil· 
lion) is little more than half of that of 
the VFf and, unlike the VFf it tackles 
both rail freight and passenger needs 
in the Sydney /Melbourne corridor. 
$3.7 billion over 10 years is, of course, 
a large outlay. However, in the cunent 
debate about financing the construe· 
tion and restructuring of our public 
infrastructure the future of rail 
transport deserves to play a crucial 
role. 
PETER FERRIS works for the Auatralle 
Railways Union. 
scheme for the workforce. Both 
devices, they argue, will lift our na· 
tional savings ratio and curb our de-
pendence upon foreign capital. 
Despite their tough upbringing, 
neither Mr Keating nor Dr Hewson 
can recount any personal experien~ 
of being unemployed. Nor have 
either, I'm sure, seen up close the 
human calamity of deflationist 
economic policies. They should 
hightail it down to a local Social 
Security office to see the face of 
Australia 1991. 
Although Paul Keating has been cop-
ping the blame for having deliberately 
engineered the recession, John Hew-
son should hardly be gloating over 
Labor's misery. Had he been in power, 
as Andrew Peacock's Treasurer, he 
would have done more or less the 
same as Paul Keating. For few 
emnomists would deny the technical 
correctness of Keating's policy of 
dampening aggregate demand in an 
over-heated economy. 
Many non-economists, on the other 
band, must be asking why we got to 
the stage of ''having to have a reces-
lion" at all. It is in this light that Dr 
Hewson and Mr Keating-swom bit-
ter enemies in the public arena-tum 
out to be ideological blood-brothers. 
For both are unreserved adherents to 
financial deregulation and free-trade 
policies. And it is the prosecution of 
these libertarian-type economics that 
has ultimately led us into having to 
have this recession. Most observers 
know that financial deregulation has 
meant the government surrendering 
quantitative amtrol over the money 
supply; instead the lending activities 
of the banks now govern it. It was like 
putting children in charge of a lolly-
shop. 
We have had the banks play the lead-
ing part in financing the debt binge, 
the takeover frenzy, the asset boom 
and now banks, by virtue of corporate 
indebtedness, being the de facto con-
trollers of multiple layers of industry. 
John Kerin has recently attacked Paul 
Keating's penchant for pulling the in-
terest rate lever. This works more like 
a hand-brake in governing the pace of 
ea>nomic activity than the smooth ac-
celerator I decelerator effect of li-
quidity controls we used to know. The 
other 'lever' of economic policy now 
rendered inoperable because of 
deregulation is the exchange rate-by 
all accounts the Australian dollar has 
become the plaything of international 
speculators. 
In his reign as Treasurer, Paul Keating 
had been forced to reduce both 
Australia's current account deficit and 
inflation rate problems solely by 
tampering with the interest rates 
lever, but any economics student will 
tell you that in macroeconomics to 
beat two problems you need two in-
struments or policy levers. Most com-
mentators, and even a repentant 
Keating, now realise that the high in-
terest rates policy enforced to curb our 
inflation rate and cure our current ac-
count deficit has only partially 
worked. By pushing up the Australian 
dollar in foreign exchange markets, 
imports have appeared all the more 
price attractive to us while our ex-
ports, actual and potential, have suf-
fered. You can find ready proof of this 
next time you are in a supermarket by 
glancing at the abundance of im-
ported foodstuffs. 
Also to blame for our import addic-
tion, in all its forms, is the Keating-
Hewson dogma on free trade. Both 
titans believe that regulation, and 
protection, have failed this country. 
Instead, both subscribe to the fuzzy 
ideal of letting market forces deter-
mine and shape Australian economic 
destiny through the 1990s. If, they say, 
we are to develop a diversified and 
robust economy for the future, we 
must let market forces rip. But waiting 
for market forces to make us a 
stronger more advanced economy is 
turning out to be like Waiting for Godot. 
Five years after Mr Keating's banana 
republic outburst we are still a com-
modity-exporting nation with only 
10% of our exports having any value-
added component. Like New 
Zealand, which has gone further 
down the libertarian economics road 
than us, Australia is fast becoming 
broke, isolated and confused about 
precisely where we are going. H any-
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thing, if the balance of payments 
figures are any guide, we seem to be 
becoming a Mickey Mouse economy; 
despite falling activity and output, 
imports (many of them necessary) 
remain stubbornly high. 
The last time I can recall such 
widespread despondency about our 
economic fortunes was in the 1970s, 
when the first vestiges of stagflation 
appeared. To this seemingly unsolv-
able problem Billy Snedden 
proclaimed that we needed "a new 
Keynes" to unravel it. Maybe so, but 
the old version of Keynes could have 
played a considerable part in getting 
out of our current economic predica-
ment; Keynes argued that countries 
suffering recurrent balance of pay-
ment deficits, like Australia, need not, 
indeed, should not, deflate their 
economy to repair the problem. 
Devaluation of the currency was the 
easier way-but, alas, this assumes 
we have a fixed, not floating, ex-
change rate. Appeals for restoring 
control over the exchange rate and the 
money supply are, of course, likely to 
fall upon deaf ears. Keynesian 
economics is long out of fashion; but 
it does show that there is a way out of 
the tangle. 
As it is, Australia is emerging from the 
recession with lower interest rates, 
lower inflation, an improved current 
account deficit and rising produc-
tivity due to the labour shedding now 
taking place. However, as soon as 
things improve and spending reig-
nites, 'the unholy trinity' of imports, 
inflation and interest rates will surely 
edge upwards again. Imports will rise 
by virtue of Australia's seeming ad-
diction for them and because domes-
tic supply will be unable to satisfy the 
rise in local demand in any case. This, 
in tum, will push up the inflation rate. 
Consequently interest rates, too, will 
rise. And so, the treadmill, or cycle, 
repeats itself. Now you can begin to 
see why economics is called the dis-
mal science. 
Whichever of our working class 
heroes makes it to the top of the greasy 
pole, you can rest assured that either 
Tweedledum or Tweedledee will end 
up well and truly rattled by the 
economy before too long. 
ALEX MILLMOW, a former Treasury 
officer, teaches in economics at Ourlea 
Sturt University. 
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Springtime 
PEOPLES 
The dramatic events of August threatened to derail the 
Soviet Union's second revolution. Instead, they look to have 
entrenched it irreversibly. For sheer 'people power', the 
resistance rivalled the Europe of 1848. In the first of our 
package of features on the USSR's 'springtime of peoples', 
David Burchell spoke to Alec Nove about the rise and fall 
of an ill-starred coup. 
lee Nove is professor emeritus of 
economics at the. University of Glas-
gow, and the author of numerous 
works on the Soviet Union, including 
An Economic History of the USSR. He was inter-
viewed for ALR by David Burchell on August 21, 
shortly after the first indications of the failure of 
the Moscow putsch. 
Why did the coup fail? 
It has failed for three very good reasons. The first reason 
was the crowds in the streets of Moscow and Leningrad. 
The second reason was the fact that the KGB and the army 
were, to put it mildly, in two minds about killing people In 
the streets of Moscow. In other words, it is no use saying 
that if the army and the KGB had acted ruthlessly, then the 
crowds in the street would have been unable to hold them 
back from the Russian parliament. Of course that's true. 
The point is, however, that even if the will to act ruthlessly 
had been present, this depended upon the instruments 
which were supposed to carrying out the killing being 
willing to do it- and I don't think they were. The third 
reason is that the organisers of the coup were a bunch of 
lacklustre, uninspiring mediocrities. Imagine, for good· 
ness sake, someone following Yanayev to the barricades. 
It's ridiculous. 
But Brezhnev was a mediocrity, and he ruled for twenty 
years. 
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It's true that Brezhnev was a mediocrity, but he was already 
in authority and not having to create that authority. In any 
case the system in the Soviet Union nowadays is quite 
different. People have made parallels with the ousting of 
Krushchev, but there are very profound differences be-
tween the two cases. Perhaps the only real similarity is that 
both Gorbachev and I<rushchev were on holiday in the 
Black Sea. Krushchev was booted out by the Central Com-
mittee at a time which the Communist Party still ran the 
show. This was strikingly not the case with this coup. 
Gorbachev was not sent on sick leave by the Central Com-
mittee; it hadn' t even met. Indeed, interestingly, the whole 
affair wasn't organised through the Party at all. And it was 
the vice-president who took over, not the deputy secretary 
of the Party. 
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And the attempt was not to dump Gorbachev as general 
secretary of the Party, but as president of the government. 
Precisely. The point is that to some extent this is a recogni-
tion of the downgrading of the Party within the ruling 
structures. Consequently, when people argue that this was 
a coup by Communist hardliners, this is a mistake on both 
procedural grounds and on ideological grounds. That is to 
say that, when they made their appeal to the people, the 
coup leaders did not make that appeal as Communists. In 
their pronouncements they did not once mention the word 
Communism; nor did they mention Marx or Lenin. 
Inasmuch as there was any ideological content in their 
pronouncements it would appear, would it not, to have 
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been an appeal to primordial Russian nationalism, and 
to the old Russian tradition of xenophobia? 
That's right. But in this, of course, they had a problem with 
Yeltsin - because Yeltsin, in his capacity as leader of the 
Russian republic, can also appeal to primordial Russian 
nationalism, though in a completely different way. But of 
course, you are right, it was an appeal to primordial Rus-
sian nationalism - though maybe hardline, great power 
nationalism is a better description. After all, a number of 
the characters involved were not ethnic Russians; Boris 
Pugo, the Interior Minister, was a Latvian, for inst;nce. 
This kind of great power nationalism is very strong among 
the armed forces, which are also very Russian-dominated. 
The other poi ntis that the position of the republics is vitally 
important. In the Baltic republics, the coup leaders 
repeated the actions of last January, when Moscow sent in 
troops to occupy public buildings. But again it would have 
been difficult for them to oust the locally elected govern-
ments by force, both because I don't think they had the will 
to do that, and because the local troops would be unwilling 
to obey orders to kill large numbers of people. 
I was in Estonia last January, and even when there were 
threatening troop movements the Estonian authorities 
were always very careful to have quite decent, civilised 
negotiations with the local army commanders. It appears 
that the same thing has happened again, and that the army 
commanders promised the Estonian authorities that they 
would not shoot at people. H you are going to organise that 
sort of coup, and if you are not able and willing to kill a lot 
of people in the process, you are going to fail. 
The coup's failure would seem to be a fairly ringing 
recommendation, for all his other faults, of Yeltsin's 
strategy of building up a mass base outside the ap-
paratus. It would appear that Gorbachev's problem is 
that he has been forced to rely upon the support of people 
whom he could not ultimately trust, and who would not 
really defend him in this sort of situation. 
That is absolutely right. There are parallels, in the history 
of other countries, of a leader trying to placate the military 
or hardliners and then being betrayed by them. Even 
Pinochet, after all, was supposed to have been trusted by 
Allende. Be that as it may, the position of the party is now 
extremely odd. They still have some power, but Gorbachev 
has considerably weakened that power and in some parts 
of the country the Party has split. In the Baltic republics, 
the majority of the party became nationalist, and a rump 
minority of the party remained loyal to Moscow, and the 
same is happening in the Ukraine. 
Does this suggest that the apparatchiks have left their 
run too late? 
Yes. I don't think enough people want to defend the power 
of the Party anymore. Where were the Party secretaries in 
the junta? Pavlov wasn't a Party secretary; nor was Yazov; 
indeed Yazov and Kryuchkov were, if memory serves, no 
longer even in the Politburo. The whole thing has been 
done as if they had accepted Gorbachev having shifted the 
focus of power from the Party to the government. It will 
gravely weaken the party. 
If the coup-makers had their own way and been allowed 
to create a stable government, what would they have 
done with the economy? 
Well, they are split too. Pavlov had an economic program 
that included marketisation and privatisation, to a limited 
degree. I think the key to the whole thing would have been 
the position of the military-industrial complex. As long as 
they feel safe that their claim on resources will be main· 
tained, they are not at all against markets in other parts of 
the economy. Colonel Alksnis, for example, the leader of 
the Soyuz group of hardliners thinks that Pinochet is a 
model for marketisation. 
Which suggests that the some of the hard and fast dis-
tinctions that have been made by some of the internation-
al media about the factions in Soviet politics are 
over-simplified. 
Everybody is split. Among the hardliners, there are some 
who believe in Russia, in an indivisible glorious past which 
has been unfortunately wrecked by Lenin and the bloody 
revolutionaries. Others are neo-stalinists, who obviously 
don't agree. Among the radicals, there are, I can assure you, 
genuine Thatcherites, as well as others who are looking for 
some form of market sodalism. So, all parties Right and 
Left are split on a whole range of questions, including the 
nationalist issue, of course. The key here is not the Baltics, 
they will eventually go their own way. But what about the 
Ukraine? How many Russians, who are by no means 
averse to democracy or the market, are prepared to let the 
Ukraine be totally independent? Some are, some aren't. 
Some,like Solzhenitsyn, want to go on bended knees to the 
Ukrainians to get them to stay in. 
Coming back to the economy, even assuming that the 
coup leaders had some sort of unified program, it would 
obviously have been impossible to return to the past ... 
It was and it is impossible. They can't! They would have 
stumbled along the road to some kind of regulated market, 
whoever was in charge. I can' t see what else they could do. 
So that sounds more like the Chinese tJuiuu:Luu. 
perestroika without the glasnost ... 
Yes, with all the difficulties that the Chinese have found 
trying to go along that particular road. The one area 
which the Chinese could do it and the Russians find 
much more difficult, is in agriculture. Chinese methods 
cultivation, being mediaeval, you can let the peasants 
on with it with water buffalo and primitive tools, but 
can't tum a Soviet collective farm on a prairie into 
high agriculture or even into traditional Russian 
ture very easily. There's also obstruction on behalf 
cials, and on the part of the management of state 
collective farms to the development of private farming. 
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Mikhail's 
Moment of 
Truth 
The Soviet coup marked the end of Mikhail Gorbachev' s 
valiant attempt to reform communism from within. 
Tony Phillips looks at the process by which the initia-
tive shifted subtly but irreversibly to the republics. 
il 
he coup in the Soviet Union on 19 
August caught most observers un-
awares. However, analysis of the situa-
tion in the USSR over the last two years 
always indicated that such a move might be ex-
pected. 
For at least the past twelve months, Western analysts have 
proposed four possible scenarios for the future of the Soviet 
Union. The first was that of a return to pre-Gorbachev 
communism, perhaps even a return to stalinism, beginning 
with the overthrow of Gorbachev and a terroristic crack-
down. 
The second consisted of a tum to the Right, but not one 
resulting in a return to the command economy. Party offi-
cials and other conservatives could be expected to clamp 
down on democratisation, which was pushing the reform 
process too quickly for their liking. The market would be 
introduced, but along the lines of the South Korean, or, at 
worst, the Chilean model. This clampdown might well 
have come constitutionally (through the conservative 
Supreme Soviet), via a coup, or even electorally, as the 
populace vented its resentment at a decaying economy on 
the democrats. 
The third possibility was simply that the political and 
economic mess might continue for quite some time. Only 
in the breakaway republics was real change likely, and 
even there it was by no means certain. A combination of 
delaying strategies by unco-<>perative bureaucracies and 
uncertainty as to where legitimate power lay might allow 
perestroika to stumble on. Gorbachev would continue to 
dodge and turn in the political wind. 
The fourth, and most optimistic, scenario -but possibly 
the one that people held out the least hope for- was the 
East European road. Somehow the democratisation 
process and the market reforms would continue in tandem 
to give the Soviet Union a more Western character. The 
problem, however, was that this seemed to be such a 
perilous balancing act. Grave doubts were often raised by 
academics, particularly economists, that early capitalism 
and democracy were incompatible. Since great sacrifices 
would have to be made by the population, an electorate 
given the chance to interfere in the economy to prevent this 
would probably do so. Therefore there would be little or 
no logical choice but to suspend democracy during this 
period. 
This argument against what I have called the East 
European road was buttressed by another which stated 
that the Communist Party and communist culture were far 
more deeply embedded in the USSR than in the former 
satellite states, firstly because they had been there longer 
and secondly because of the 'passive Russian 
temperament'. 
Yet it is this fourth scenario which now appears the most 
likely. The Soviet Union after the coup is now almost 
certainly also post-perestroika in its original form- which 
is to say the attempt to reform communism rather than 
replace it. How did this come about? Possibly the best way 
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to begin to answer tnis question is to examine the ron-
tradictory nature of perestroika itself. 
Perestroika began as a program for making oommunism 
run properly, above all in the realm of the eronomy. The 
command administrative system was running out of 
steam. Its capacity to perform a transition from an exten-
sive to an intensive economy (or, if you like, from produc-
ing more to producing better), to continue to provide the 
military with hardware to match the Americans, to provide 
ronsumers with goods of any quality and sophistication, 
or even to keep growing at all, was seriously in doubt 
It was from the need to reform the eronomy thatGorbachev 
first chose the strategy of glasnost, then democratisation 
and finally market reforms. Each new strategy did not just 
reduce the rontrol of the old system, but also the ability of 
Gorbachev and his allies to control the pace of events. A 
process which began as an attempt to root out the corrup-
tion of the old guard in the name of the system has left the 
system itself, and the man who would still stand with it, 
Gorbachev, friendless and isolated. 
That Gorbachev himself did not foresee that this course of 
reform rould not succeed can be attributed to a number of 
factors, of which three seem to me to be seminal. Firstly, 
Gorbachev was fundamentally out of touch with life in the 
Soviet Union. In this he was probably no different to most 
other highly placed apparatchiks, but under conditions 
where democratic and demagogic politics have become 
more and more important, this was increasingly impor-
tant. 
The serond has to do with his status as a true believer. 
Gorbachev did actually believe that communism could be 
made to appeal to and rally the people. The ideology of 
Lenin was still credible if the perversions perpetrated by 
Stalin and Brezhnev rould be swept away. How a holistic, 
rationalistic theory of knowledge that claimed to have the 
single truth about everything social, political and 
eronomic rould be reconciled with democratic politics was 
a postmodern question which Gorbachev did not even 
appear to have considered. In short, Gorbachev hoped to 
replace structures organised by the discipline of 
democratic centralism with a network of power generated 
via culture and ideology, and in this he was simply naive 
about both the intellectual and social material he was 
working with. 
The third factor was Gorbachev' s weakness in the field of 
economics: again a weakness he shares with most other 
apparatchiks brought up in a culture focused solely on 
decrees and production. Questions relating to distribution, 
demand and co-ordination receive scant attention in the 
Soviet world. This meant firstly that Gorbachev had no real 
understanding of the fact that corruption was the logical 
outoome of unarticulated and choked demand within the 
rommunist system. 
Corruption and the collapse of moral life were a clear 
example of a leakage of the economic system into the 
cultural world. Furthermore, rorruption played a vital role 
in allowing the official economy to actually work, probably 
helping the system as much as hampered it Some realisa-
tion of this slowly seeped through to the leadership as 
advice to adopt market reforms more quickly, but this was 
something they patently refused to do. 
This weakness in economics also came through in simple 
fiscal policy. The Soviet leadership since 1988 has pursued 
the contradictory policy of half a market. They expect some 
sectors to operate as if money is a means of exchange 
related to supply and demand and the other sectors as if 
money is still a form of indirect ration cards. As a result the 
government has rontinued to print money, causing mas-
sive underlying inflation which has considerably 
weakened the economy and thus their legitimacy. 
The threads leading to the August coup really began to be 
drawn together with Gorbachev's decision to introduce 
democratic elections in 1989. The restoration of the 
republican parliaments ultimately led to the reintroduc-
tion of dual power in the USSR- Lenin's coup of 1917 in 
reverse. Reconstructed as a base from which to mount a 
fresh reform assault upon a recalcitrant CPSU, the 
Supreme Soviet became a forum for a breakdown in Party 
unity and a platform for opposition groups out of an 
proportion to their actual numbers in the Soviet. Glasnost 
had given them some voice, but the parliaments had 
amplified it. 
The Republican parliaments in particular often provided a 
clear voice both outside the Party and outside the ap-
paratus. The system did not now just face reform; it faced 
alternatives. 
After the 28th Congress in 1990, two issues emerged which 
set the reformers and the hardliners on a collision course. 
The first was the future of the Union. Here Gorbachev 
rontinued to align himself with the preservation of 
central state, even though he was clearly at a loss as 
exactly what this strategy should be. The second was 
future of the command eronomy, or more particularly 
personnel whose interests were bound up in it The 
of reform, and the Shatalin 500-day rlan in 
threatened to wash vast numbers o 
November 1990 Gorbachev yielded to the corlSPJrval~vA 
Pavlov was appointed prime minister and Yanayev 
president; Shevardnadze resigned in disgust. 
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Gorbachev had a minor win with the success of his Union 
referendum, but continually falling economic production 
and Yeltsin' s march towards the Russian presidency forced 
him to make a deal. The Union treaty, which would neces-
sarily result in a massive loss of authority for the ap-
paratchiks, was agreed to in April - but the old guard 
struck on August 19, the day before it was due to be signed. 
Whileitisalittleearlyto embark on a full-scale explanation 
of the circumstances surrounding the failed coup, anum-
ber of features can be noted. First, the politicisation of 
Soviet society has been proceeding at a number of levels 
and at an accelerated rate over the last three years. The 
Communist Party, now divided and bereft of much talent, 
was now not only a plural political entity in its own righti 
this willingness to think and act politically had also 
penetrated the apparatus, including the military and 
security forces. It is particularly notable that the middle-
level officers in the armed forces, always crucial in coup, 
appear to have been lost to Yanayev's group. 
The coup was always hesitant: not just because its leaders 
appeared to have no actual positive vision, but because its 
chain of command was extremely shaky. The leaders could 
never be quite sure that when they pressed a button it 
would really work. The military and serurity forces were 
at best doubtful, and in some cases actually swapping 
sides. 
Again, the republican parliaments had achieved a massive 
amount of legitimacy. The position of people's deputy had 
been an important springboard for the opposition from the 
very beginning (witness the way radical deputies swept 
into Georgia in 1989 to investigate the Tbilsi massacre, 
despite attempts by Interior Ministry troops to close off the 
area). All over the Soviet Union the republican parliaments 
remained more or less in charge. Even where they were run 
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by conservatives they were reluctant to hand over power. 
It was the People's Deputies in Leningrad and Moscow 
who, proudly wearing their official emblems, approached 
the tanks and demanded to speak to the commanders. Four 
years ago the republican parliaments were mere ciphers of 
Party poweri their actions in August 1991 clearly stamp 
them as independent political actors in their own right. 
Finally, it is impossible to ignore the talents of the opposi-
tion movement. Yeltsin, Rutskoi, Sobchak, Popov and their 
supporters scarcely put a foot wrong, which perhaps indi-
cates that they, at least, were well prepared for this even-
tuality. Yeltsin in particular used his charisma in a way 
which highlighted fully the complete alienation from the 
people of the conservatives (who apparent! y froze out their 
own potential demagogues, the Soyuz movement). 
Lastly, the Soviet people, and especially the Russians, by 
moving to the barricades gave a complete lie to their 'pas-
sive nature', and laid to rest what was now no more than 
the myth of Soviet terror. The last vestiges of the power of 
Stalin were swept away in the streets of Moscow and 
Leningrad during the coup and its aftermath. A civil 
society is most definitely now alive and well in the Soviet 
polity, and able to defend itself. 
Ultimately, Gorbachev's dream of reform was just riding 
too many contradictions to stay upright. The coup' s overall 
effect appears to have been one of accelerating reform and 
consolidating its gains. Gorbachev at least got one thing 
right when he said that its defeat showed that perestroika 
had taken root in society. Not only has it taken root, it is 
now leading a flourishing life of its own. 
TONY PHIL UPS is a researcher in the Centre for Soviet and 
East European Studies at Melbourne University. This article 
was wriHen in the days following the August coup. 
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The Empire 
Struck 
Back 
Constantin Pleshakov, a Soviet scholar, argues that we 
are seeing the death throes of one of the world's most un-
successful empires. 
i] 
he Soviet Union today is in a time of 
trouble. A huge and powerful country, 
stable in its stagnation for many years 
(perhaps since 1930 when it became 
clear that the policy of collectivisation would not 
result in a successful peasant uprising) is now 
weak and politically shaky despite its nuclear 
warheads, missiles and submarines, factories 
and plants, the army and the KGB. The old Soviet 
Union is now in its mortal agony and it will die. 
Will many people weep? Not in the Soviet Union 
itself-in the country which used to be the prison 
of peoples and the jail of souls. But what 
frightens people is the transition period &om the 
old Soviet Union to the new country (or countries 
for that matter) which will be built in its place. 
What are the main features of the contemporary crisis in 
the Soviet Union which make it one of the greatest social 
earthquakes in human history? There are two: the agony 
of socialism and the agony of empire. When these two 
tremendous processes come together it results in an 
unimaginable outburst of energy (in most cases destruc-
tive) which most comparable countries have been spared. 
The dismantling of socialism is now common to all of the 
countries of the former 'socialist camp' (except Albania, 
Cuba and North Korea, but even there the outburst of 
people's anger is inevitable in the foreseeable future). But 
for countries like Hungary and Poland it is not as painful 
as for the Soviet Union-a country which used to regard 
itself as a cradle of world revolution and, as late as in 1979, 
tried to introduce socialism to one more country-Af· 
ghanistan. But even the pains of dismantling socialism 
would not in themselves have led to the global crisis-
however difficult they might have been. The greater prob-
lem is that the dismantling of socialism in the USSR 
coincides with the dismantling of an empire-and this fact 
is a sufficient reason for having a pessimistic prognosis. 
The Poles or the Germans can be optimistic; they are 
adjusting their society to the macrosystem of the outside 
world. The Soviets simply do not know what their society 
is; they understand that there is an Armenian society, an 
Estonian society, a Moscow society, but-as in any other 
empire-there is no such thing as a 'common society'. The 
West flattered the Soviet Union by calling its people 'the 
Soviets'.(Nobody~ven Stalin-in the Soviet Union has 
ever dared to call its people 'the Soviets'; everybody used 
the unnatural term 'the Soviet people'.) The Soviets have 
no identity and the peoples of the country are in search of 
it now. Is it not dangerous to search for national identities 
in a country stacked high with weapons of mass destruc-
tion? 
Because of its nature the Soviet Union cannot even have a 
national crisis-it can only face an international crisis in 
which different peoples are involved. 
The Soviet Union might have survived the decline of 
marxism, but it will hardly survive the decline of empire. 
In one sense, the Soviet Union was mainly an empire and 
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of ideology; that of empire is more broad and basic. 
Empires can be marxist, or Islamic, or Confucian; marxism 
IDd Confucianism were borrowed by peculiar types of 
11ate to beoome empires; for empires first of all need some 
kind of idea to build their rore. 
It is more or less clear what a 'socialist' state is. But it is 
muc:hmoredifficulttounderstandwhatempireis.Oneday 
10me scholar living in a peaceful democratic country will 
p to the roots of empire as such, and general laws of 
Imperial development will become clear. But now I would 
like to suggest only a few ideas about the nature of an 
empire. I am in an advantageous position because I belong 
to those who know an empire from the inside-to the body 
ol dtizens of the Soviet Union-perhaps the last empire in 
the world. Of rourse, one could argue that China, too, is an 
empire, but China is much more homogeneous-and if it 
is an empire, it is a sort of quasiempire which will not see 
IUc:h devastating decline as its Soviet neighbour. 
What is an empire? Is it justa country possessing colonies? 
In that sense was Holland an empire? Definitely not. Even 
Prance after Napoleon rould not be regarded as an empire. 
Perhaps what is crucial is the idea of empire. Suddenly, 
from 'nowhere' emerges the idea of consolidating different 
nations under the banner of one, and imposing the culture 
of this nation upon the others (it could be marxism, Islam 
or Roman law). Soviet historian Lev GumUev explains such 
fluctuations by outbursts of energy, the origins of which are 
unknown. He calls that energy passionarity. 
Paul Kennedy, in his The Rise tmd Fall of the Gmd Powers, is 
inclined to the eronomic explanation of the development 
of empires. This is, of course, a Uttle simplistic: many 
empires in their prime were not economically efficient. The 
British empire was arguably efficient, as was the Chinese; 
the Russian/Soviet empire was not, and Hitler's empire 
was an eronomic nonsense. 
While the laws of empire development are still obscure, it 
is clear that any empire, in time, is doomed to decline. 
The decline might be a civilised one, bringing order and 
law to the former colonies and peace and prosperity to the 
oore of empire-that was the case of Britain (with the 
significant exception of Northern Ireland). The case of 
Rome was oompletely different and led to endless wars, 
chaos and anarchy. In a sense, when we speak about these 
two archetypes, the Soviet Union seems to be closer to 
Rome than to Britain. The tragedy of the Russian empire 
was that its colonies were not overseas and were not 
regarded as colonies; they were added to the rore of em-
pire-Central Russia-and nobody knew where the 
mlonies ended and where the core began. 
FEATURES 17 
There are a number of different scenarios for the next 30 or 
40 years in the USSR's history. The most pessimistic would 
see a bout of nuclear civil war followed by a long 'Dark 
Ages'; the more optimistic would see a relatively stable 
divorce of the nationalities, followed by a long period of 
moderate but independent development under a liberal 
democratic system. But even in this scenario there would 
be military clashes in the Caucusus and elsewhere. 
The only possibility that I would exclude is a oompletely 
peaceful transition to a new Soviet Union. The coincidence 
of these two factors-the dismantling of socialism and the 
dismantling of the empire, makes it totally unrealistic. The 
Dark Age of Russia began in 1917; somewhere in 1988 
Armageddon began. Now we are living through it. There 
is no medicine for imperial cancer. The empire has to die. 
But will the offspring of the empire be sensible enough to 
bury it with dignity and not turn the funeral into a mas-
sacre? 
CONSTANTIN V PLESHAKOV la a senior research fellow 
in the Soviet Academy of Sciences. He wu writing before 
the events of August. 
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Favourite 
Son 
Eduard Shevardnadze was Gorbachev' s closest confidant 
until he resigned last December, predicting a coup. Tony 
Phillips looks at the man who has now assumed the 
status of a Soviet prophet. 
hen Eduard Shevardnadze resigned as 
Soviet foreign minister in December 
last year he created shock waves not 
just around the Soviet Union but 
around the world. Gorbachev himself was said 
to have been alarmed and surprised. The jolt 
was made all the greater by the explanation 
Shevardnadze gave: .uLet this resignation be my 
protest against the impending dictatorship". 
At the time, many Western analysts saw Shevaninadze's 
plea as an exaggeration. Now, following the August coup, 
it seems prophetic. In view of all this it is informative to 
dwell a little on the personal history of Shevaninadze, 
once the sole non-Slav in the Politburo and possibly one 
of the most influential foreign ministers in modem his-
tory. Shevaninadze is particularly interesting not just 
because he played such a major part in undoing the old 
world order, but also because he and Gorbachev were, in 
the heyday of perestroika, such a close double act. 
Shevardnadze, like Gorbachev, could easily have been 
viewed ten years ago as just another loyal apparatchik on 
thewayup. He had actually got a little furtherinhiscareer 
than Gorbachev, becoming first secretary of the Georgian 
Communist Party in 1972, when he was a personal 
favourite of Brezhnev. While Gorbachev never achieved 
this dubious status, other similarities between them were 
quite strong. Both shared the unusual background for 
oommunist superstars of an educational background in 
the humanities; Gorbachev' s first degree was in law (an 
almost pointless area under the Soviet system of decree 
rather than rules), while Shevardnadze trained as an 
historian. Both were of the Khrushchev generation 
(Shevaninadze is two years older than Gorbachev.) Both 
seemed imbued with a strong anti-stalinism-they were 
there when the victims began pouring back from the 
camps-but are nonetheless loyal to what they see as the 
values of socialism. Uke Khrushchev, both appear to have 
believed Soviet communism could work if only it were 
honestly applied. Gorbachev moved quickly to dispense 
with the cult of the general secretary, while Shevardnadze 
had a formidable reputation as a corruption-buster in 
Georgia. 
As with Gorbachev, the personal history of Shevardnadze 
provides glimpses of the champion of glasnost he was to 
become. The line from Andropov to Gorbachev begins 
with the attempt to make the Soviet system work honest· 
ly. Gorbachev took Andropov's anti-corruption fervour 
and added to it the crucial ingredients of glasnost and 
democracy. This set in train a process in the Soviet Union 
that has in ideological terms seen the dominant 'radical' 
ethic move from an economistic anti-market pro-state 
ownership approach to a political pro-democracy anti-
oligarchy one. 
Despite his historian's training, Shevaninadze had his 
greatest successes enforcing law and order on rorrupt 
officials and eoonomic criminals as the chief of the Geor-
gian police. This was his claim for promotion to Georgian 
party boss. However, once installed he was not slow to 
use his 'favourite' status to institute local economic 
reforms which, in fact, decriminalised some of the acts he 
had been prosecuting and raised the general economic 
output of the republic. Shevardnadze was by no means a 
liberal democratic angel, but neither was he the typical 
Brezhnevite flunky-cum-fat-cat. 
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1\vo aspects of his different style as party boss before the 
Gorbachev asamdancy are worth noting. First, he had a 
mnciliatory approach to disputes. Confronted with a hos-
tile, stone-throwing crowd in Abkhazia in the late 70s, 
Shevardnadze simply stepped forward and confronted the 
leaders. He spent the rest of the night in discussion. Such 
actions indicate a degree of self-confidence unusual in any 
politician, let alone a Soviet communist. I would argue that 
here we can see yet another parallel with Gorbachev, and 
further I suspect that, at bottom, the source of the self-con-
fidence for both men was that they were and perhaps still 
are believers. They believed in socialism, they believed it 
muld work and they believed in its explanatory power. 
The second noteworthy action of Shevardnadze' s career 
was his baclcing for the film Repentance. The quintessential 
destalinisation film, made by a Georgian and shot in a 
quasi-surrealist manner with strong religious overtones, 
Repentance shocked and delighted filmgoers all over the 
Soviet Union on its general release in 1987. Shevardnadze 
threw his support behind the director Tenghiz Abuladze in 
1981, assured financial and production support via Geor-
gian television and then pushed the finished product past 
important Politburo members, including Yegor Ligachev. 
As foreign minister, Shevardnadze presided over a series 
of momentous events which culminated in the end of the 
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Cold War. Apart from negotiating vital arms agreements, 
the Soviets have withdrawn from Afghanistan, allowed the 
collapse of Soviet-backed regimes in Eastern Europe, nor-
malised relations with China and opened diplomatic ties 
with South Korea. They also applied a fresh approach to 
the Middle East which put more emphasis on peace and 
stability than superpower rivalry. 
Two things can be said of Soviet policy as it evolved under 
Shevardnadze. Ftrstly, it moved from a doctrinaire and 
ideologically-informed 'class-confrontationist' policy to 
one of 'realism'. That is to say, Soviet foreign policy now 
presumes explicitly that states have interests which they 
seek to maximise while maintaining some degree of 
stability. Realism is, of course, also an ideological posi-
tion-but it is one that most other states subscribe to, 
particularly those of the West. The explicit adoption of this 
position undoubtedly helped dialogue between the Soviet 
Union and the West Secondly, Shevardnadze utilised the 
vocabulary of humanism in bargaining to great effect. It is 
still debatable whether the relinquishing of Gorbachev's 
and Shevardnadze's foreign policy was chiefly animated 
by weakness at home or a desire for an 'offensive peace 
initiative'. What is clear, however, is that the language in 
which they couched that policy privileges the idea of a 
world community in a manner which has often made the 
West, and especially the US, uncomfortable. 
The ideologies of humanism and realism should be logical-
ly contradictory, but Shevardnadze combined them 
surprisingly successfully. The chief outcome was a strong 
emphasis on conciliation of disputes and a move away from 
reliance on military means for prevention of war. During 
the 19th Party Congress in 1989 Shevardnadze made a 
strong attack on traditional thinking in Soviet foreign 
policy, arguing that war could no longer be a rational basis 
for policy, and that national security was more than the sum 
of one's arsenal. He went on to demand further weapons 
reductions and described the Soviet stockpile of chemical 
weapons as barbaric. 
Not only did Shevardnadze admit very early on that much 
of Soviet foreign policy had been wrong, he explicitly 
linked his changes in foreign policy to domestic changes. 
That Soviet foreign policy is made on the back of, and 
undetpinned by, successful perestroika, was a continual 
theme in his speeches: hence his willingness to intervene 
occasionally in purely domestic matters. The most dramatic 
example came in December 1989 when Shevardnadze 
threatened to resign over the massacre of protesters in 
Thilisi in April of that year. He said at the time: "Nothing 
and nobody can justify the deaths of innocent people." 
The reasons for Shevardnadze' s resignation in 1990 have 
been a matter of much conjecture. We have his own ex-
planation that it was a personal protest about the way 
things were heading. It can be added that it was logical that, 
after Yeltsin and other radicals left the party and the con-
servatives gained ground, the liberals such as 
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Sheva.rdnadze and Yakovlev would follow the radia:Us. 
Some in the Soviet press speculated that the military-in-
dustrial complex had forced him out. Amore sceptical view 
argues that Gorbachev had Shevardnadze in mind as the 
man to negotiate the new union treaty, but the wily foreign 
minister decided not to accept the poisoned chalice. 
In the light of the August coup attempt, it might also be 
suggested that Gorbachev was faced with the same 
scenario last year, but elected to go along with the hard line. 
Sheva.rdnadze, perceiving this as something of a coup in 
itself, left Whichever account is closest to the mark, the 
resignation was quite a momentous one-not simply be-
cause of the context, which was dramatic enough, but also 
because Eduard Sheva.rdnadze may well go down as the 
first modem Soviet politician to retire willingly at the peak 
of his glory. 
In February this year Sheva.rdnadze popped up again with 
plans to establish an association to act as a think-tank on 
Soviet foreign policy. All the familiar Shevardnadze 
themes were present in his interviews: the importance of 
perestroika, the role an independent association might 
play in shaping foreign policy, the need to continue the 
ongoing pro~ and so forth. However, by July this year, 
the association had metamorphosed into something quite 
different: the Movement for Democracy. Among the 
leaders of the movement were: Sheva.rdnadze, formerGor-
bachev political adviser Aleksandr Yakovlev and 
economist Stanislav Shatalin.lt also attracted support from 
Yeltsin's Russian vice-president, and leader of the Com-
munists for Democracy, Aleksandr Rutskoi. 
This grouping, made up of many of Gorbachev's former 
allies, looked set to split the Communist Party in early 
August. It was certainly a place of refuge for those seeking 
to leave, including perhaps Gorbachev himself, eventually. 
When the coup took place, the Movement joined with 
Yeltsin' s forces very quickly. It was certainly able, through 
the standing of its members, not just to rally popular 
support (Yeltsin's great strength), but also to hold back 
those in authority whose support was vital to the success 
of the coup. In the end, Shevardnadze did more than just 
protest against a coming dictatorship, he helped prevent 
it. 
So the double act of Sheva.rdnadze and Gorbachev ended 
with Sheva.rdnadze standing in a besieged Russian parlia· 
ment, denouncing Gorbachev for his weakness towards 
the hardliners which had allowed the coup to happen. In 
the coming months, it seems certain that Eduard 
Shevardnadze, an architect of the end of the cold war, will 
play a new and important role as an architect of a new order 
for the Soviet Union itself. 
TONYPHILUPS it a rnean:herin the Centre for Soviet ancl 
Eaat European Studio at Melbourne Univenity. 
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The Limits o 
CIVILI 
In the wake of Eastern Europe, much of the Western Left 
has placed its faith in the new citizens' movements of the 
East. Paul Hirst finds the enthusiasm misplaced. There is 
no romantic alternative, he argues, to the dull necessity of 
building a Western political system with contending 
parties. 
T 
he dissolution of Soviet rule in Eastern 
Europe and the collapse of the Com-
munist Party's monopoly of power in 
the Soviet Union has opened up the 
necessity to think afresh about the political and 
constitutional future of those countries. This 
necessity is no less real in the West than in the 
East 
At the same time we have no ready-made answers to guide 
that thinking. Marxism offers no guide; it has spumed 
concrete political and constitutional debate in an obsession 
with building a socialist society. The dominant Western 
concept for analysing actually existing socialism, 
'totalitarianism', is now obsolete, as the political structures 
which it attempted to capture have dissolved. Western 
liberal-democratic theory cannot analyse the complex 
processes of transition to new political regimes, as it offers 
a political ideal that is nowhere accomplished in Eastern 
Europe and which is, at best, the goal of some of the 
reformers in those countries. The political thinking 
developed by the democratic oppositions in the satellite 
states of Eastern Europe may appear to be more of a guide. 
Yet, as I shall try to show, it too is obsolete; shaped by the 
experience of resistance, it offers no adequate political 
model once the states dependent on Soviet power have 
collapsed. 
This theoretical vacuum is matched by the ambiguity and 
uncertainty of political conditions in Eastern Europe. The 
Soviet Union in particular is threatened by dissolution and 
political chaos. This is an exceptional situation without 
historical precedent, and one which leads to complex and 
contradictory political responses. The Gorbachev leader-
ship, for example, has tried to move in two apparently 
contradictory directions at the same time. It has attempted 
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to turn the Union into a real federation of self-governing 
republics based on a new treaty. It has also created an 
executive presidency that it hopes will prevent the seces-
sion of republics and contain conflict by ruling by emer-
gency decree. In neither the Soviet Union nor in the 
ex-satellite republics is it clear that 'democratisation' will 
solve the political problems they face. Indeed, in the Soviet 
Union greater democracy may simply create the political 
mechanisms for intense social conflict and national frag-
mentation. 
This is a difficult situation for the Western Left to com-
prehend. In retreat from fundamental socialism, it has 
staked its political future on the advocacy of the 
democratisation of both state and civil society in the west. 
It has hailed the revolutions of 1989 in Eastern Europe as 
offering the hope of democratic renewal and removing the 
antagonistic structures of the Cold War that inhibited radi-
cal reform in the West. The euphoria of the revolutions is 
already over, and new and harsh political realities confront 
the reformers in the East The Western Left has quickly to 
comprehend these realities if it is not to be seduced by its 
own illusions. The Cold War is at an end, but this does not 
mean we are on the verge of a new era of peace and 
international harmony. Developments in Eastern Europe 
could well result in an altogether more complex and 
threatening situation. 
When Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in 1985 the West 
was still involved in the second Cold War that began with 
the invasion of Afghanistan in 1978. No serious Western 
observer imagined that in five years the monopoly of the 
Communist Party over Soviet politics would be for all 
practical purposes broken, that there would be intractable 
conflicts between democratically elected governments in 
the constituent republics of the USSR and Moscow, and that 
the full extent of Soviet economic failure would be publicly 
accepted by the party. In 1988 no serious Western observer 
could have predicted the revolutions of 1989, which 
destroyed the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe. The same 
is true of even the most acute members of the East European 
opposition. 
Some Western thinkers had long indulged the hope of 
Soviet collapse: many had portrayed the Soviet Union as 
an inefficient and ramshackle command economy; but the 
Communist Party's iron grip on political power remained 
an inescapable fact. In practice, the West had to deal with 
the Soviet system as a going concern, to attempt openly to 
subvert Soviet power was to court the edge of the nuclear 
abyss. In 1956,in 1968,andevenafter Afghanistan, Western 
governments were forced to practise realpolitik. So in a 
different way were the oppositions in Eastern Europe. They 
were forced after 1968 to treat Soviet domination as a fact, 
to work within the constraints and contradictions of Soviet 
rule. Until the very last gasp of Soviet power the opposition 
was forced to accept that the partition of the world effected 
at Yalta in 1945 was irreversible but, given that, they sought 
to exploit Soviet weakness. The opposition began to act 'as 
if' Poland, for example, was a free country, thereby at-
tempting to undermine state power up to but not beyond 
the point where it would provoke a fatal crisis of the 
regime. 
How did the party's grip loosen? From the 1920s until the 
1980s official Soviet writers presented the construction of 
socialism in the USSR as a story of uninterrupted economic 
and social progress. Soviet socialism built an industrial 
society by brutal and ruthless methods, but it brought the 
USSR to the brink of modernity, where comparisons with 
and expectations of competing with the West became ap-
propriate. At this point its failure became apparent and 
inescapable; a system created by 'primary socialist 
accumulation' and the continuous expansion of heavy and 
defence industry reached inherent limits of organisation 
that imposed declining returns. Soviet industry expanded 
by the extensive exploitation of natural resources and 
labour reserves, growth by ever more lavish squandering 
of inputs. By the 1970s the limits of such extensive ac-
cumulation had been reached. 
However, despite the inefficiency of the Soviet economy 
there was no reason why the Soviet leadership should have 
accepted either the reality of failure or the need for reform. 
The Soviet Union could have embarked on a course of 
continued confrontation with the West and an aggressive 
foreign policy, imposing sacrifices on its citizens in the 
course of containing enemies without 
What prevented this neo-stalinist policy emerging is a 
matter for conjecture. Part of the answer is that by the 
mid-1950s nuclear deterrence had removed the option ofa 
policy of wholesale rather than piecemeal and proxy con· 
frontation with the West. Soviet military expansion was in 
large part the attempt to match the West in the numbers 
and sophistication of nuclear weapons. This brought no 
advantage, only a stalemate. A reckless policy of confron· 
tation was checked by the fear of a nuclear exchange should 
a crisis get out of hand. 
The effects of this militarisation in the Brezhnev years was 
to reinforce economic retrogression. Giveri the inefficiency 
of the Soviet economy, military expansion forced an ever 
greater burden on the civilian sector, consuming between 
25% and 30% of GOP. The drive for nuclear parity brought 
with it a resolute Western response, an arms race whose 
costs the Western economies could bear far more 
Soviet leaders therefore faced an escapable crisis by 
mid-1980s-accelerating military expenditure that neither 
brought 'security' nor the means of diversion from domeso 
tic ills through foreign confrontation. Stalemate was 
chased at an ever higher price. Western leaders 
President Reagan and Mrs Thatcher were clearly oreoan~dl 
to sustain the arms race to levels where the USSR 
compete. 
The West 'won' the Cold War, but only because the 
leadership possessed the rationality to give way. At 
this surrender to the needs of internal reform and 
peace was cautious and conducted through 
rhetoric. Mikhail Gorbachev came to power as a 
committed to renewing the Soviet system so that it 
become more efficient and preserve its grip on power. 
aim was threefold-to lessen international tension 
reduce the burden of arms spending, and to make 
institutions work efficiently but without relinquishing 
party's monopoly on power. Glasnost was to permit 
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flow of information and discussion in order to breathe life 
into official policy making, undoing the illusions and lies 
that passed for official thought in the Brezhnev era. 
Perestroika was to restore legality, to recreate inner-party 
democracy, and to combat corruption and incompetence 
in the bureaucracy. But- as Gorbachev's own book 
Perestroika shows--not to abandon leninism. Gorbachev 
still relied on the illusion that the leninist state could be 
renewed, that a 'true' efficient communism was possible. 
In the first stages of reform he was far from abandoning 
the leading role of the Communist Party or the basic struc-
tures of the command economy; on the contrary, these 
were to be rebuilt by honest communists who could both 
speak freely and act within the law. 
Slowly, but inexorably the agenda of reform was shifted in 
response to the realities of the Soviet crisis and the effects 
of freer public debate. His regime has been driven to 
radicalism because it permitted a measure of objectivity to 
enter into the debate about the true nature and future of 
Soviet society. Gorbachev was driven toward a more radi-
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cal foreign policy by the desperate need for accommoda-
tion with the West. A lasting peace was impossible while 
the Soviets retained the option of containing reform in 
Eastern Europe through force. The Soviet Union thus at 
first left its satellite governments in Eastern Europe to their 
own devices, leaving them to make what accommodation 
with their peoples that they could-a process that led to 
what Timothy Garton Ash called 'refolution', (ie, a blend 
of reform from within and revolution from without the 
state), a phenomenon evident in Hungary and Poland, 
absent in the GDR and Czechoslovakia where the existing 
elites staged a last-ditch defence. 'Refolution' became 
revolution once the Soviet government made it clear that 
it would not back militant repression by force. Collapse 
followed swiftly, because fear of military force vanished 
once Moscow refused to play the role of gendarme which 
Russia had exercised in Eastern Europe since the 19th 
century. The revolutions occurred, not because the opposi-
tion could seize power through an internal dynamic-it 
was weak in the GDR and in Czechoslovakia, and on the 
verge of failure in Poland-but because Moscow aban-
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doned the satellite parties and left them neither the means 
nor the will to resist. 
Is the Soviet Union too passing from reform into 
'refolution' and, finally, in the not too distant future, into 
dissolution? It has certainly passed to 'refolution'. It has 
become evident even to cautious reformers that an ade-
quate program of economic change cannot be achieved 
without radical political change. The economic renewal of 
the Soviet Union requires the decentralisation of economic 
decision-making, the autonomy of enterprises, the creation 
of alternative sources of investment. This involves the 
dissolution of the economic control of the 'ministries', 
autonomy for the republics, privatisation, the creation of a 
'hard' currency, the ending of the state monopoly of foreign 
trade, and the creation of capital markets. This is simply 
incompatible with the party's monopoly of power and it 
requires the separation of party and state. Once this is 
accomplished the party cannot refuse genuinely free elec-
tions, multi-party competition, and the sovereign 
autonomy of the republics. The Soviet system is at the edge 
of what can be attained by 'refolution', and is currently 
hesitating. Reform has come too late to be an orderly 
process, and was never possible within the existing con-
stitution once the national aspirations and antagonisms, so 
long suppressed by the centre, could be given expression. 
However, the possibility and the success of the necessary 
economic changes remains in doubt H Soviet political 
institutions are inexorably transformed and yet the 
economy fails to begin to deliver some measure of 
prosperity, then the prospects for a relatively stable transi-
tion to a new sodal system are bleak. The Soviet system 
cannot cope with an open conflict between the centre and 
the republics, with conflicting agendas for reform, with 
defections from the Union, and with mass unemployment 
and poverty. 
Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland are in the process of 
constructing Western style parliamentary democratic 
states and market economies. The new leaderships 
recruited from the democratic and anti-communist opposi-
tions see this dual process as an essential pre-condition for 
removing the objective foundation of the postwar Soviet 
system. Political pluralism and the winding up of the 
economy are politically essential if the sources of the 
monopoly of power by the party are to be eliminated, even 
if they bring in train conflict and economic dislocation. 
Nevertheless, some elements of the new political elites in 
both Czechoslovakia and Poland have tried to cling to a 
source of legitimacy that had force in opposition as a basis 
for avoiding conflict in the new transitional period. That 
is, they are preying on the rhetoric of 'dvil society' and the 
idea of a united 'dtizens' movement standing above the 
traditional party-political divisions. Elements in both Civic 
Forum/Public Against Violence in Czechoslovakia and 
Solidarity in Poland have, until as recently as the early 
summer of 1990, hoped that these movements could 
remain majority coalitions, sustained by popular citizens' 
initiatives at the base. 
One should remember that this experience of opposition 
was entirely novel, and that the advocates of resistance 
through 'civil society' were responsible for a remarkable 
innovation in political strategy. Havel, Michnik and others 
preached non-violent resistance and Solidarity was able to 
practise it on a sodal scale in Poland after 1980. By not 
contesting political power, by building parallel structures, 
by mixing dialogue and resistance, the opposition in 
Poland was able to build a base of power beyond the reach 
of state repression. Martial law in Poland could suppress 
opposition and drive it underground, but not eliminate it 
As a strategy for resistance, for creating opposition to 
communist attempts to pulverise political alternatives, it 
worked-up to a point This experience was formative of 
the new political elites, as resisters. It in no way equipped 
them for power. 
'Civil society' made sense in the context of the communist 
regime's attempts to monopolise all sodallife and culture. 
It drew on sources of autonomy the regimes could not 
crush except at the price of wrecking their own com-
promises essential to the survival of their power-like the 
concordat with the Church in Poland or, less effectively, 
their formal subscription to the Helsinki accords. However, 
therein lies the great weakness of the appeal to 'dvil 
society'. Once sodal life is not monopolised, once inde-
pendent political, cultural, educational and other institu-
tions have the space in which to emerge, then the basis for 
the homogeneity of the forces united in opposition to the 
illegitimate communist state dissolves. Civil society, in 
another sense, opens up a field of potential conflict and 
competition between the forces hitherto brought together 
by a repressive state, and which hitherto possessed a com-
mon interest in helping each other to survive. 
Yet a new solidarity cannot emerge wi thou~ the institutions 
for some new form of political co-operation. To appeal to 
the old solidarity, to the old unity of 'dvil society' is to try 
to recreate a political experience whose conditions are past. 
The appeal is credible to those who voice it because poll ti-
cal parties are as yet prototypical and social interests are 
still incoherent, and not yet institutionally defined. Yet the 
process of political definition of the opposing groups can-
not long be avoided if new source of stability are to be 
introduced into the system. These sources will not spring 
from the old 'civil sodety' and they cannot recreate the old 
'solidarity'. 
The new sodeties of Eastern Europe will not quickly create 
the dvil sodety of Western Europe. But they must quickly 
create the forms of political stability characteristic of 
Western Europe, that is, parties that define clear political 
alternatives and act as a political check one upon the other. 
Without such explicit expression and containment of 
political conflicts, the antagonisms that are emerging can-
not be deflected by normal political processes of opposi-
tion, bargaining and compromise. These antagonisms are 
powerful-national and regional differences, the diver-
gent interests of city and countryside, and of workers in 
large and inefficient socialist enterprises versus the 
economic modernisers. 
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'QvU society' is not homogeneous, and clinging to the 
political myth of its homogeneity fostered by the ex-
perience of opposition will probably do the opposite of 
what is intended, that is, accelerate the conflict between 
Cll'lain interest groups and the state. Only the creation of a 
party system and the building up of a political culture that 
aa:epts competition within democratic norms can secure 
tbe transition to Western representative democracy. This 
will be difficult if economic success and consumer 
prosperity do not come relatively quickly. H they do not-
and that is the most likely outcome-then political stability 
may be threatened. Social interests may become increasing-
ly antagonistic and political forces increasingly polarised. 
this is a real threat if the previous constraints of the 
authoritarian regime cannot be quickly replaced by a sys-
tem of institutionalised pluralist conflict and a stable party 
system. In this context constitutional questions are of the 
ubnost importance. The state must be strengthened both as 
a means of protecting citizens' rights through constitution-
alguarantees and an independent judiciary, and as a means 
of preserving political order through the constitutional 
defence of the power to govern. In central Europe this 
balancing act may just prove possible. 
The advocates of 'civil society' and an overarching 
'dtizens' movement' are seeking to delay this process of 
formation of a party system in the interests of short-term 
political harmony. They are seeking a democratic 
depoliticisation through a unified majoritarian rule of a 
dtizens' bloc over and against the aim of political contain-
ment through a Western style party system. The theory of 
'dvil society' developed on the liberal Left It has found 
Western advocates on the Left; those who, like John Keane, 
aeek the renewal of Western democracy through citizens' 
and social movements. The East European advocates of 
'dvil society' like Vadav Havel and Adam Michnik were 
non-violent and anti-authoritarian radicals. Yet the idea of 
a majoritarian bloc, building a mass base of support and 
mntaining the parties, could well develop in an altogether 
less libertarian direction. 
'Civil society' as a homogeneous political force is an idea 
at variance with modem pluralist mass democracy, which 
relies on the divisions of society expressed in political 
mmpetition contained within the party system to ensure 
social and political order. Homogeneity can only be 
preserved if interests are not radically divergent. H they are, 
then a majoritarian regime can only work through a degree 
of authoritarianism which contains and suppresses other 
interests, which rests marginalises political competition. 
This cannot be liberal. Such a regime is more likely to be of 
the Right. 
It is more than possible that the political divisions in at least 
one of the Eastern European countries will not be contained 
in stabilised political competition, that such divisions will 
lead to a conflict in which one party prevails. In that 
ron text, however, a new majoritarian-monopolistic regime 
may draw on at least some aspects of the ideology of 'civil 
society' and appropriate the experience of opposition as the 
basis for a new legitimacy. Regimes in decolonised 
oountries in the Third World, like Indonesia or Ghana in 
the immediate post-independence period, used the myth 
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of national homogeneity and the unity forged in the libera-
tion struggle to justify 'guided democracy' or one-party 
rule. It would be sad but not impossible for such an 
analogous regime to emerge in Eastern Europe. 
An Eastern Europeplunged in poverty and unemployment 
may repeat the political experience of this region between 
the wars, where dictatorship was the norm rather than the 
exception. Western Europe has a powerful interest in en-
suring stability in such countries as Czechoslovakia, Hun-
gary and Poland by providing them with the aid, 
investment and technical assistance necessary to 
prosperity. This is in our immediate political interest and, 
in practice, gives a priority to Western aid over and above 
even the pressing need for greater social and economic 
justice in the Third World. They have become our satellites 
now, not those of the Soviets. 
'Civil society' as an 
homogenous political force 
is an idea at avriance with 
modern mass democracy 
The collapse of Soviet rule in Eastern Europe has in effect 
restored the 'cordon sanitaire' the Western states created 
against the USSR in the 1920s. That zone of economically 
and militarily weak states, governed predominantly by 
fragile dictatorships, constituted a source of weakness 
rather than strength. The precise conditions of the 1930s are 
unlikely to be repeated, but a zone of weak states on the 
border of an unstable and dissolving Soviet regime, outside 
the Western security system, offers multiple sources of 
conflict. 
Even the most encouraging scenario is fraught with 
problems. The successful incorporation of the Eastern 
states into the Western economic, military and political 
order will inevitably push the 'West' towards the Soviet 
border. It would then face the Soviet world on a new 
frontier and one which gives both the USA and EC a real 
interest in the political future of the area which was the core 
of the Soviet Empire. A USSR that achieved the transition 
to democracy and economic renewal would pose no great 
threat. An unstable and dissolving USSR is a real menace 
to the West, if the West has to think of a frontier that begins 
in Poland. For that reason, the West has an immediate 
interest not only in the states of Eastern Europe, but in the 
political future of the USSR. Whether the Union will sur-
vive, and if so, how, are questions not only for Moscow but 
for Brussels and Washington. 
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The report into Black deaths in custody is four months 
old, but most responses have been either apathetic or 
dismissive. Liz Jackson asked ex-commissioner Pat 
Dodson why the report has been so little feted. 
at Dodson was one of five commis-
sioners of the Royal Commission into 
Black Deaths in Custody, which 
reported in April. He is a longtime 
Aboriginal activist and a leading figure in the 
push for national land rights legislation. He is 
now director of the Kimberley Land Council in 
WA. He was interviewed by Liz Jackson. 
It's now been almost four months since the release of the 
report of the Royal Commission. What do you think of 
the response to the issues raised by the report over that 
time? 
The response has been disappointing in my view, given the 
oonsiderable effort and money that was put in to deal with 
the complex and far-ranging underlying issues which give 
rise to the high levels of custody. Unfortunately the media, 
and the governments to some degree, have concentrated 
on the same matters that give rise to the Royal Commission 
-the allegations of foul play and even murder. These were 
the matters that people were expecting to find solutions to 
and rightly so, I suppose. But the Commission attempted 
not only to address the criminal justice system and the 
investigation of complaints but also to look at how services 
to Aboriginal people could be better co-ordinated and 
delivered, and at how a better understanding between 
Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal people could be estab-
lished. It is disappointing that that side of the 
Commission's report hasn't taken off. Most people seem to 
be simply seeking a quick answer to what has been a tragic 
experience in the lives of many Aboriginal people. 
Do you have a concern that people will say that because 
there was no finding of foul play by the Royal CoDUJlil.. 
sion, there were no recommendations of charges, tMt 
therefore there is nothing wrong with the system, we 
don't have to worry about it? 
I'm very concerned about that. The fact is that the Com· 
missioners who enquired into those individual cases came 
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to those conclusions, but if we leave that as the solution we 
will not have learnt anything. H we as a nation simply drop 
what the Commission has said to be the underlying issues, 
we have been derelict in our responses, it seems to me. 
Do you think that part of the problem is that people feel 
that the social disadvantage of Aboriginal people has 
already been extensively researched and so they don't 
expect the Royal Commission to tell them anything new? 
I think there may be a fair bit of truth in that. The Royal 
Commission is all about providing a mirror for non-
Aboriginal people to see the history of their contact with 
Aboriginal people- that is, to understand how things have 
come to be as they are today. So there is no excuse for the 
Australian people or for governments to say they are un-
sme what it is that needs to be done or how to proceed, 
because the recommendations clearly indicate how those 
problems might be addressed. 
I recently conducted a three day bush meeting at Mary 
River, between Fitzroy Creek and Hall's River out in the 
I<imberley, which was attended by some three or four 
hundred people from the various Aboriginal communities 
in the Kimberley. The majority of police stations in the 
Kimberley region were represented, as well as the super-
intendant in charge of the area and the police union repre-
sentative. So we sat down for three days out in the sticks, 
they presented to me a range of their concerns, and it also 
gave them the chance to see that there are many Aboriginal 
people who do take a responsible attitude to their com-
munity and the problems of the impact of Western law as 
well as the impact of their own customary law. In these 
sorts of situations I have been impressed by the concern of 
West Australian people, across all sectors, to try to find 
ways of addressing the levels of custody that Aboriginal 
people are exposed to. But what surprises me most and 
concerns me most is the lack of follow-through on the part 
of the government. 
There is a view that since 1967 federal governments hue 
been giving out money to Aboriginal groups and we 
don't seem to have anything to show for iL Television 
programs can still be made that show appalling health 
statistics, appalling incarceration rates, appalling hous-
ing conditions. Do you think that some people in the 
community just feel Uke throwing up their hands and 
giving up? 
I think that is right. Many people came to my conferences 
and put the view that Aboriginal people simply have to put 
together the figures and then collect a pile of money from 
Canberra or some other place that they had total and 
unfettered control over. Very few people realise that the 
decision-making process is somewhat removed from 
Aboriginal people. They have very little say over the way 
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problems should be addressed, because programs are 
devised by government departments and then applied to 
Aboriginal people. There are some communities where up 
to 40 agencies in the course of one week have met the same 
Aboriginal group, offering a range of programs, all aimed 
at benefiting that group, without any real co-ordination or 
an integrated approach to what the impact was going to be. 
In that situation people feel fairly powerless over their own 
affairs, and the response to that sense of powerlessness is 
simply to let the bureaucrats do what the bureaucrats want 
to do. The lack of control over their own affairs underlies 
the excess drinking of many Aboriginal people, and it is 
understandable to me that ordinary Australians watching 
the news throw their hands up in horror at finding that 
Aboriginal people are still experiencing all these tremen-
dous social problems. But the other side to that coin, is the 
efforts that are being made by Aboriginal people to put 
positive proposals about how some of those things should 
be addressed. It's the interaction between those efforts and 
the bureaucratic reality which is the area that most 
Australians don't understand, because it doesn't affect their 
lives to the same degree. The Commissioners have pointed 
this out as one area that really needs to change. 
The Commission certainly recognised that Aboriginal-con-
trolled organisations should be given a greater level of 
acknowledgement for the things they do, and that, given 
resources, those things will only enhance the relationship 
between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal people. They are 
also important in breaking down the stereotypes about 
Aboriginal people being incapable of running their own 
affairs. 
Non-Aboriginal people tend to think that these organisa-
tions arise because people want to have some form of 
apartheid. That's not the case. The experience of these 
organisations is that people feel better able to utilise their 
services because in most cases the people who are 
employed in them tend to be more responsive and under-
standing of the broader and social and cultural problems of 
Aboriginal people. 
The Royal Commission saw an inverse realtionship be-
tween the strength of Aboriginal organisation and the 
kind of underlying causes that cause deaths in custody. 
What about land rights? How much of a causal link are 
you prepared to say there is? 
LOOK, 
no hands~ 
I 
1988 
If there is a lack of security to land for Aboriginal people, 
that gives rise to a myriad of social problems for Aboriginal 
as well as non-Aboriginal people. If you have people who 
live around the fringes of towns because they have no 
access to land that they are able to establish proper houses 
upon, then you are always going to have fertile ground for 
prejudice arising in the community. Land is important from 
that point of view, but it is also important to the very 
identity of Aboriginal people, as it centres around the 
religious beliefs and practices that are essential to people's 
concept of who they are as a people. One of the responses 
the Premier of this state made to the Royal Commission 
report when it first came out was that land rights was back 
on the agenda. Within two days of making that statement, 
however, she claimed that was not what she really said. 
The Report comes down with a strong statement in favour 
of reconciliation as a way forward for Aboriginal people. 
Does that mean that your Commission is endoning the 
10-year reconciliation process that the Minister for 
Aboriginal Affairs has proposed? 
No, it doesn't mean that; the concept of reconctliation that 
the Commissioners were talking about is not necessarily to 
be identified with a particular political thrust that the cur-
rent Minister for Aboriginal Affairs may have. Obviously, 
there are some tangential connections, in terms of the idea 
that what is required in Australia to heal the rift between 
Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal people is to break down the 
barriers that exist, to get rid of the stereotypes, to reduce the 
fears and apprehensions that people have about each other, 
to build up and strengthen where there are weaknesses on 
both sides of the fence. So, to reconcile people is a noble type 
of thing to do, but it is also a practical and essential thing 
to do, if we are going to reduce the levels of expenditure 
that we rurrently have for police, health and special types 
of programmes to tackle the backlog of needs that exist in 
Aboriginal communities. No doubt it will fall short first up, 
because it is the first attempt, but that doesn't mean that the 
ideal of reconctling people and provide a greater sense of 
freedom and respect should be done away with. 
Do you think there is a problem, though, in the coa-
fidence that Aboriginal people will have in the procesaaf 
reconciliation. precisely because it does fall short of PI'" 
vious goals that Aboriginal people have put forwudf 
Each of these policies has fallen short of the nT~·vt~OIIR ·~M.. 
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National land rights was the most ambitious and then the 
'lftaty was a fallback option from that, and now recon· 
dliation is being described as a further fallback. Is that 
all that people are going to have to settle for now? 
Well, I think they are immediate reactions that are valid for 
people to make. But I would think that any initiative that 
tries to be positive about terrifyingly difficult and complex 
Issues needs to have some support given to it to make it 
work. Australians are great knockers of things. I think you 
have got to bepositiveaboutthefutureof Aboriginal/non-
Aboriginal relationships in this country, otherwise the 
whole thing degenerates. This perception that govern-
ments never do anything to address legitimate concerns is 
DOt entirely true, and it would be wrong to continue to 
maintain this as the status quo situation, because govern-
ments do respond in a lot of positive ways, even if not 
always with the best thought-out strategy. But they do 
respond; at least there is a concern. And as I have said in 
the report, it's a concern that I have found dearly in this 
state among a wide cross-section of the community, for an 
improvement in the conditions of Aboriginal people not 
just through acts of largesse or the welfare system, but to 
Improve the standing Aboriginal people have before the 
law and the rights they might have in order to assert their 
positions. 
So, I think there is a lot of goodwill there. There are lots of 
simple efforts being made by many different people, not 
all of them are world-shattering events or activities but 
they are terribly important to the people in those areas and 
In a cumulative way they are important for the country the 
alate and the nation. 
Aze you concerned that we are heading into a decade that 
loob Uke it will be dominated by conservative polltiu? 
Although things may be bad in a lot of areas now, people 
could say, politically speaking, that you've never had so 
sooct? 
I really don't know if we are heading towards a conserva-
tive reign of politics or not. I can only say that conservative 
politics in a lot of cases have produced the best results for 
Aboriginal people and those that have promised things of 
a radical nature have often wafted away in the wind. 
Australia has projected itself internationally as a country 
with some concern for justice in the broader arena, and in 
relation to South Africa in particular. And as we have seen 
very recently with the visit of our Foreign Affairs minister, 
it is not immune to the perception of foreign journalists of 
the relationships of any government with the indigenous 
people in this country. So I'm not entirely pessimistic about 
the way in which Aboriginal rights would be dealt with 
under any other government. The United Nations have 
declared 1993 as the Year of Indigenous Peoples. If 
Aboriginal people remain the most over-represented 
group in the social requirement areas, whatever govern-
ment is in power will be held accountable for that. 
In summing up the work of the Royal Commission, you 
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Wked about those things that may take a decade but 
there are things that are more pressing such as the imme-
diate causes of those deaths. What do you think are the 
most important things for governments to focus on im· 
mediately? 
I think they have got to focus on those recommendations 
that impact on the criminal justice matters. Reali y, you have 
got to look at those seriously, to see how Aboriginal people 
can play a greater part in that area. It's not just having 
liaison committees but having Aboriginal people in the 
police department, and the Attorney-Generals depart-
ment, having an Aboriginal panel of some type that is 
capable of looking at justice matters for Aboriginal people. 
I think that governments have also got to seriously look at 
providing alternative places for custody for those people 
who are not criminal but happen to be intoxicated or 
people who need to be taken into protective custody, so 
that the police are not the ones who have to shoulder that 
responsibility. They need to look at the nature of alterna-
tives to custody for certain types of offences, and at ways 
in which Aboriginal people can participate in the discipline 
of their own people in a creative way. Those things appear 
to me to be commonsense things to do. 
What do you think it says about the relationship between 
pollee and Aboriginal people that the families of people 
who died in custody still feel, angry, bitter md dissatis-
fied after the Royal Commission report? 
It's a terribly tragic situation, and hard for Aboriginal 
people to accept, that someone of their family has died 
while in custody of the police. The Royal Commission, 
while it has not recommended that charges be laid, clearly 
highlighted the concept of duty of care. If you take 
someone's freedom away from them, and place them in 
custody,thenyouhaveadeardutytolookafterthatperson 
and to ensure their safety, and there should be no com-
placency about that That way of understanding the duty 
of care has not been the norm. That is what the Commission 
has said; that there was a fair! y indifferent standard of care, 
in a number of places. Now certainly the excuse for not 
having a proper duty of care is no longer available, but the 
deaths are still a matter of concern. I would hope that the 
history of this tragic relationship over the last ten years that 
the Commission has looked at, is never repeated. And if 
the recommendations are adopted, it will go a large way to 
addressing that 
On a more hopeful note, I am more confident that the 
general goodwill in the community is such that people are 
no longer prepared to tolerate the appalling statistics of 
Aboriginal people are taken into custody in this state -43 
times more likely than non-Aboriginal people. That is an 
appalling record. 
This is an edited version of an interview conducted for ABC 
Radio'• Background Briefing in August. Tapes of the pro-
gram are available from ABC Radio Tapes, GPO Box 9994 in 
each capital dty. 
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CITIZE 
and Democrats 
In recent years the claims of citizenship have ranked highly 
in the catalogue of Left values worldwide. Yet Australian 
Labor has had little or nothing to say about the citizenship 
debate. Peter Beilharz argues that the problem lies in the 
evolution of labourism itself. The answer may be a 
reconstructed and revitalised social democracy. 
hat has happened to marxism, politics, 
democracy and socialism? With the fall 
of the Wall, the collapse of communism 
and the increasing sense that the 
present is history, the temptation is to forget that 
marxism was in aisis from at least the late 1970s. 
A number of particular factors were evidently at work 
then; the rollapse of Eurocommunism and the hopes for 
union of the Left in Franoo, interminable wrangllngs in the 
British Labour Party, the emergenoo of Green politics, the 
work of Andre Gorz and Rudolf Bahro, the continuing 
feminist aitique of marxism, the parting of ways between 
marxism and feminism, the explosive work of Foucault 
among them. One key book in this process of dissolution 
was Nicos Poulantzas' last work, Stllte, Power, Socilllism 
(1978). Poulantzas, like the Spanish Eurocommunist Fer-
nando Claudin, broke away from classical marxism exactly 
on the grounds that marxism had very little to say about 
politics, or more particularly about demoaacy. 
The fall of the Wall, in this sense, is the consolidation of this 
process of dissolution and rethinking: not its beginning. 
The reallsation that marxism had no real theory of politics 
preooded the reoont, apocalyptic events across central and 
eastern Europe. Gramsd, of course, anticipated some of 
these difficulties by rejecting the idea of proletarian 
socialism and arguing for the neoossity of class alliances, 
eschewing the developmental tales of earlier marxism. In 
reformist ways, the necessity of class allianoos was also the 
premise of two of the proudest moments in modem labour 
politics-the Attlee government in Britain between 194.5 
and 1951, and the Whitlam government in Australia.1972· 
1975. The relationship between class and politics, however, 
has always been a major problems for socialists, whether 
revolutionary or reformist. The Bolsheviks, and those who 
might still long for them, could indeed argue that they had 
politics sorted out; what was missing from Marx's theory, 
they would argue, was not a theory of politics but a theory 
of the party. Politics was really the business of the party. 
Enter Lenin-for his sole a>ntribution to marxist theory 
was the postulate of the vanguard party; most other pa111 
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of Leninism are borrowed directly from Marx or Kautsky, 
or Hobson or Helvetius. 
Today, most of us are past vanguards, if stuck with mass 
parties. We're stuck, in addition, with parliament. Those 
among us who maintain closer ties to class politics probab-
ly still persist in viewing parliament as a bad joke (there's 
no denying that it can be a joke). But as marxism has come 
apart, some others among us have rome to similar ron-
dusions from a different direction. For, from the early 80s 
on, many marxists gave up their formal associations with 
communism and realigned with the heir apparent, the new 
hope, the new ALP, Accord unsheathed and at the ready. 
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Now, in the 90s, labour politics seems to have become a 
laughing stock-but that, again, is the reoent tum. The 
problem which precedes it is that the labour tradition, like 
the marxist tradition, is big on class and short on politics. 
None of this is to say that class is insignificant, let alone 
redundant. It stares us in the face every day of our lives, 
and especially in periods of depression. The problem with 
class politics, however, is that it immediately identifies 
questions of our goals-the good society, however im-
agined-with questions of interests. This hits an old knee-
jerk in Australian political culture, where politics has 
always, historically, been identified with producer groups, 
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whether business, unions or agriculture. Thus politics in 
Australia has always been dominated by economics-and 
politics has oome to be identified as the pursuit of group 
or class economic self-interest by other means. Class 
politics has worked against the development of civic cul-
ture. 
If we reject the more abstract utopianism of, say, Lenin's 
The State and Revolution, where the 'good' society is staffed 
exclusively by male oomrades, proletarians-if we accept 
difference, and accept the fact that the society of the future 
will still have classes and competing interests-then the 
question becomes, how can we get beyond the 'politics' of 
self-interest? One way to begin to follow this line of pos-
sibility is to imagine the denizens of the future not as 
comrades or proletarians all but as citizens. This is an old 
way of thinking, which harks back to Aristotle and, more 
radically, was a keystone of the hopes of the French Revolu-
tion. The argument is simple. Persons in a society, con-
ceived as a oommunity, have rights and duties by virtue of 
their membership-their physical presence-in that 
society. Rights and duties are integral to persons, but not 
as capitalists or unionists, rather as just that-persons. 
Class inequality is by no means ignored in arguments for 
citizenship. Rather, it is reoognised as a structural fact, the 
consequences of which might be modified by a polity 
which endeavours to pursue equality as a goal, rather than 
to identify the good society with the interests of the 
workers-as marxism does-or with the interests of capi-
tal-as oonservatism does. 
Arguments for citizenship in Australia have barely taken 
off yet. The arguments got further, for a spell, in Britain, 
where in the 80s a three-oomered battle took place between 
Labour, the Conservatives and the Liberal/Social 
Democrats over what citizenship meant and which party 
could best help to foster it. There was a fascinating moment 
which saw the political philosopher and advocate of 
citizenship Raymond Plant writing speeches for Neil I<in-
nock, and the historian David Marquand publishing his 
brilliant study of The Unprincipled Society-a title echoing 
Tawney's classic critique of Britain as The Actfuisitive Society 
(1930). It seemed then that there might be some chance to 
establish a public space in which argument oould proceed 
about the permanence of property, the desirability of 
democracy and the necessity of tension between them. 
Modem arguments about citizenship were revived in the 
1880s by 'new liberals' such as T H Green in exactly this 
kind of context-one in which poverty was recognised as 
a major social obstacle to the development of individuals, 
and where property was acknowledged as a substantial 
impediment to the lives of those who existed without it, or 
with only their labour power to sell 
Given that we are bound by traditions, our typical response 
to the situation of hiatus or crisis is to look back, to attempt 
to reoover arguments and sources from earlier moments. 
We all do this-whether oonservatives, catholics, socialists, 
feminists or libertarians-for we all live in history, carry 
with us notions of the past, like the oollective unoonscious. 
Thus marxists return to their precedents and pasts---a 
positive process, for there is much to learn from pragmatic 
marxists such as Kautsky, who understood very well what 
conservative animals we are, and how difficult and uncon· 
trollable attempts to change the world are. However, it's 
also worth turning to other traditions which marxists have 
self-righteously spumed, such as Fabianism, Guild 
Socialism, and co-operation. But these are all largely other 
people's pasts. What of our own, in Australia? 
As I have suggested above, the biggest obstacle here is to 
be found in the limits of Australian labourism itself. As the 
term suggests, labourism is an explicit and wilful trans-
ference of economic ooncems into political demands. H we 
define politics as the open-ended process of contingent 
compromise between groups and persons marked by dif. 
ference with the aim of social and individual elevation, 
then labourism has no politics at all. The closest we get, 
perhaps, is the foggy-headed evangelism of Chifley' s 'light 
on the hill' ,orWhitlam'smeritocraticimpulsestoelevatfon 
through education and health care support. 
Labour's politics since the 1890s have been caught up with 
the pursuit of state power and representation in its own 
interests. The strongest symbol of this is the trend which 
can be called state experimentalism. The question of the 
state and its role in recent Australian history is an intrigu-
ing one, especially because everybody agrees that the state 
has been central but no one has really explained the spedfie 
content of Labor's statism. For labour statism, indeed, hll 
largely been pragmatic. When we read, for example, 
Evatt's biography ofW A Holman, Australilm lAbour l.tltltW 
(1942), we get a sense of civilising purpose or progra-
sivism, but only an instrumental defence of statism; the 
state is merely the means to pursue economic develop-
ment, to combat unemployment, to provide cheap 
foodstuffs through state butcher-shops and so on. Visitinl 
German Social Democrats, oonvinced of the superioritycl 
their own tradition, sooffed at such tum-of-the-centurf 
exercises in state provision. This was not socialism. A1ld 
probably they were right For the real achievement of 
German Social Democracy-classical marxism after Marx 
and Engels-was the creation not of a state within a stall 
but of a society within a society, a set of social relatiOIII 
which could support and protect them from Junbt 
capitalism, if not from nascent reaction in the 1930s. 
the Social Democrats managed this even though they hid 
no word for citizenship. Citizens were defined in Genna 
as Barger, simultaneously citizens and bourgeois, 
being no word which suggested the possibility of 
ingthetwo. 
So we're back, again, to the problem of property ml 
citizenship. Ever since socialists have been PrePUed 
make peace with markets and money rather than sl~•• 
about their abolition, the issue of property has 
larger on the Left Indeed, the earlier labour Left 
haunted by the image of yeoman socialists, envisaging 
good society as one back on the land; 'three acres 
cow' or something a little more ambitious than that. 
urbanism, in a sense, became a half-urbanised version 
that dream-the quarter-acre, perhaps, and a Vi eta 
of the oow. Yet Leftists have often got no further 
on the issue of property, except perhaps to aclc:nmovle: .. 
the legitimacy of having a crack at running a ......... "-.! 
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shop or something like that. To put it in economic terms, 
tbe Left has never really been able to address the issue of 
entrepreneurship, let alone to provide an alternative vision 
ol how economic life might be organised. 
There are, however, others within Australian history who 
aa:epted the rights of property but argued that for rights, 
there were also duties. The most obvious figure here isH 
B Higgins, whose 1907 Harvester judgment can be 
aiticised from various perspectives, but not this one. 
Higgins' view was plain: no duties, no rights. Capital had 
no god-given right to existence or valorisation outside its 
aoda1 context and responsibilities; if it could not offer 
deamt wages, for example, it should not operate in a 
particular industry at all. 
Higgins, together with others such as Walter Murdoch and 
Alfred Deakin, represented the legacy of colonial 
liberalism into the early 20th century. As Stuart Macintyre 
shows in his recent A Colonial Liberalism, this positive ap-
proach to citizenship was earlier pioneered by men like 
Charles Pearson, George Higinbotham and David Syme. 
There are parallel feminist stories about women such as 
R.ose Scott and Catherine Helen Spence. Each of 
Macintyre's trio was in a different way dedicated to the 
development of the public sphere: Syme and Higinbotham 
via the print form, Higinbotham via the law and in parlia-
ment, Pearson in education. The concept of citizenship in 
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their hands was active, rather than passive-it involved 
duties as well as rights-even if it nevertheless was con-
strained by Victorian ideas of race and gender. Their 
predilections may have been white and patriarchal, but at 
least they worked for a politics of public purpose. 
They were followed, in tum, by other radicals and new 
liberals who can for convenience be grouped together as 
the WEA liberals, for they worked in and around that 
fascinating but oft-maligned institution, the Workers' 
Educational Association. They included among their num-
ber figures such asH C Coombs, G V Portus, W G K Duncan 
and Meredith Atkinson. Their project was to enable the 
pursuit of citizenship through community education, and 
in this they took a very different approach to citizenship or 
welfare than did the state experimentalists. They could 
argue in defence of state provision when it could be seen 
to enable participation, but not for its own sake; their 
orientation was, at least until the 1940s, local rather than 
national. Put in different terms, theirs was not a socialism 
of the stomach, but an argument that individual, group, 
and community were all deeply in need of spiritual 
development. 
The consequences of my argument are clear. Neither mar-
xism nor labourism have ever been strong on democracy 
or on citizenship. In the larger, global case of marxism the 
implication is that marxism's relation to liberalism in 
general, and to radical or new liberalism in particular, 
needs to be reassessed completely. For whatever the flaws 
of liberalism-including its own failure to be sufficiently 
democratic-liberalism has taken democracy much more 
seriously than marxism ever has. In the local, immediate 
case,labourism has failed to develop strongly political or 
democratic credentials because its purview has been exact-
ly that of the socialism of the stomach. I do not mean this 
judgment to be dismissive, but simply critical. The 
Australian labour tradition can legitimately make all kinds 
of noble claims about its travails, but they have been con-
ducted within the horizons of this kind of imagination. 
It follows from this, too, that it is time to acknowledge that 
the stronger arguments for citizenship in recent Australian 
history have been advanced not by labour but by those 
often chastised or stigmatised as 'friends of labour', people 
like Higgins who actively worked with labour, but were 
not of it, and others like the WEA intellectuals who did not 
even think in terms of the cause of labour so much as the 
prospects of the community. Labour has had its closer 
friends who argued for citizenship: Evatt, before he joined 
the ALP, while he was a student of Francis Anderson at the 
University of Sydney; Whitlam, who in some ways sought 
to bend the ALP in communitarian and national directions 
into the 1970s through schemes such as the Australian 
Assistance Plan and Medibank. On the whole, Labor's 
legislative mindset has been closer to that of state ex-
perimentalism, viewing individuals as comrades or sub-
jects rather than as citizens. 
But this, too, brings us to another difficulty-the way in 
which arguments for citizenship were then garnered by the 
other bunch who drew on liberalism, the nascent Liberal 
Party of R G Menzies. Tnroughout the postwar period two 
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different but related processes have made it even more 
difficult to argue for citizenship than it may previously 
have been. The first is the conservative appropriation of the 
idea of citizenship and its reduction to the trivia of flag-
saluting and tree-planting. The second is the increasing 
social acceptance that citizenship was only about rights 
and not duties, about welfare provision rather than politi-
cal or social participation. 
All of this helps to explain why arguments for citizenship 
have had such little hearinginAustraliaoflate. Citizenship 
can too easily be mocked, as a token of puritan morality 
and imperial bootlicking. Moreover, the fundamental 
reliance of both marxism and labourism on the language 
of class means that the idea of citizenship can easily be 
ridiculed and rejected as incapable of addressing or 
transcending the brutal realities of class inequality and 
oppression. This is a pyrrhic victory for marxism and 
labourism, however, for they have no practical solutions to 
the nasty face of capitalism either, save for rhetorical 
resorts to the language of incremental reform or millennia! 
revolution. Nor are they easily able to address problems of 
oppression outside the labour market, let alone beneath it, 
in the underclass whose members cannot merely be ex-
plained away as members of the industrial reserve army 
or as 'workers out of work'. 
A more incisive critique of citizenship is the feminist case, 
that citizenship is really only for boys anyway. If politics is 
seen as a contract between men, against women, then the 
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slogan of citizenship is obviously unhelpful-we need a 
new kind of politics. But if the newer arguments are seen 
as emerging from the already existing traditions, then 
liberal feminism may still have some way to go. Citizen. 
ship may have been constructed in a patriarchal way, but 
then it can also be reconstructed. 
In this regard, the positive postulate of citizenship in the 
90s can be viewed as a political extension of the sociological 
critique of corporatism which was directed against the 
ALP-Acru Accord in the 80s. Arguments against cor-
poratism pointed primarily to the problem of exclusion-
that social contracts are envisaged as deals between peak 
representatives of producer groups which therefore 
reconstitute citizens as producers and ignore and exclude 
citizens who are not constituted as authorised producers. 
What has shifted, in this argument, is the implicit allianc1 
between the critics of corporatism and the revolutionary 
marxist critics of class collaborationism. Through the 701 
and into the 80s, corporatism was viewed largely as social 
democracy's attempt to geld the labour movement by ID-
corporating it into the state. Once we transcend tru. 
notions of the working class as a redemptive actor, we111 
also bound to rethink the idea of social contracts and the 
issue of social belonging. It's also timely, in this context, 110 
rethink the legacy of the social-democratic tradition itself, 
for social democracy after World War Two also came 110 
accept passive ideas of provision rather than active cona~p­
tions of citizenship. 
The defence of citizenship is entirely compatible with the 
critique of corporatism and also with the defence of clal 
compromise. The idea of socialism, indeed, remains incon-
ceivable without the idea of class alliance. The diffe~ 
today is that class alliances cannot any longer be privileged 
over other forms of political liaison. The process withla 
which the Left is living is, in a certain sense, a return to 
social democratic tradition which was elbowed out of thl 
main light by the incredible popularity of 
after the October Revolution, the Depression and the 
Patriotic War. Socialism is now being reconstituted as 
of the democratic project, returning to broader quEsliOIII' 
of equality, democracy and participation. The 
socialist streams which ran in separate directions out 
French Revolution are now entering a process of l"PTTl_,na. 
tion. 
This is not to suggest that humanity is back where 
nity started, nor that modernity has so far provided us 
all the bits which we need to create a better future. Thil 
no more likely than the prospect of resolving the 
theoretically by scotchtaping together Marx, Mary 
and Lyotard. Distressed as we may feel, these are 
ing times to be alive-fearsome, and yet 
prospects for the future may appear to be modes•t, 
are more challenging than anything we have enc:our1te111 
since the 60s. 
PETER BEILHARZ is an editor of 'Tile sis Eleven. 
ments are pursued furtherin Beilharz, Considine 
Arguing About the Welfare State: the Australian 
(Allen and Unwin, forthcoming). 
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Scandinavia 
I om ( onllirh' 
This is a brilliant, eccentric and amusing work, focusing on 
the links between rultural and political events in the region 
over the last two cenruries. 
Wakefidd Press 
43 Wakefidd Sueet, Kent Town, South Australia 5071 
Ph (08) 362 8800 Fax (08) 362 7592 
TROUBLED TIMES 
ALR helped set the agenda with its influential set of articles on 
Labor's new age of anxiety. Now those articles, along with others 
commissioned especially, have been published as a booklet by 
ALR in conjunction with the Fabian Society and Pluto Press. 
Labor's Troubled Times discusses the proble~s of Labor's diminish-
ing membership base, the role of factions, the declining culture of 
Laborism and Labor's increasingly perilous social base. It features 
contributions by Bob Hogg, Sue McCreadie, Bob McMullan, 
Robert Ray, Marian Simms, Lindsay Tanner and others. 
ALR readers can purchase Labor's Troubled Times at the reduced rate of just $4.50, ·post free (normal rrp is 
$6.95). Just send remittance to ALR, PO Box A247 Sydney South NSW 2000. 
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COMING TO THE 
PARTY 
Britain's Labour Party is undergoing a crisis of identity 
very similar to that of the ALP. Dennis Glover compares 
the experiences with the Australian debate conducted in 
ALR. 
The ongoing debate in ALR on the factional, structural and 
policy directions of the ALP in many ways mirrors that 
occurring in the British Labour Party which has been inch-
ing its way to an historic structural overhaul. The ascen-
dant sections of the party, from both the Right and Left, 
tmions, parliamentary and constituency sections, believe 
that the notion of a tmion-dominated socialist party is an 
unpopular anachronism. The future, they believe, lies in 
the social democratic model predominant in Europe. Here, 
I want to approach briefly the Australian debate in the light 
of the British experien~which provides some thoughts 
on how Australian Labor could make itself more respon-
sive to the social forces of the 90s and thereby give a more 
radical platform greater legitimacy in the eyes of the elec-
torate. 
Labor in the 90s has to appeal not only to those who identify 
as unionists or interest group supporters, but also those 
who wish as individuals to live in a more democratic 
IOdety-people who support demands for a more liberal, 
equal and sustainable soctety but who oppose the cor-
poratism and democratic compromises that they perceive 
Labor currently implies. These are the people who are 
currently attracted to the Australian Democrats and to the 
Uberal Democrats in Britain. 
The current changes in the structure of the British Labour 
Party attempt to address these issues. They are designed to 
transform it from a traditional trade union dominated 
democratic socialist (its critics say '1abourist"} Labour 
Party into a European-style social democratic (its critics 
argue American-style Democratic} party. 
Power within major parties, the electorates have judged, 
must be taken away from groups whose entrenched posi-
tion militates against proposals for reform and instead be 
given to those who represent the emerging new social 
forces. These new structures must conform to soctety's 
notions of what now constitutes democratic decision· 
making. 
The British Labour Party's current structure derives from 
its origins as the parliamentary voice of the trade unioa 
movement, and power within the party still rests largely 
with the unions. There is a growing consensus within the 
party that this should now change, as soctal changes make 
the union dominated 'Labour' parties less appropriate and 
less appealing to a constituency which increasingly iden-
tifies itself according to factors other than union member-
ship eg, gender, as consumers, as environmentalists and 10 
on. 
In line with this changing emphasis, the leadership of 
party is currently pushing for the adoption of a one 
ber, one vote system of preselection. This would replace 
current system whereby locally affiliated unions 
soctalist socteties get a substantial bloc vote on the 
tion panels in each constituency. 
At the same time, policy making is being transformed 
two ways. First, a thorough Policy Review has just 
carried out, following the highly publicised 
Us tens' campaign which was designed to rid the 
the image of the Leader taking orders from the uruons 
militant party members. 
Secondly, proposals will be put to the next conference 
up a 170-strong National Policy Forum which will 
year round, continually reviewing policy and 
platform to the conference which can be amended 
floor. 
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How should one interpret these changes taking place in 
a-itish Ulbour? Could they provide an example for those 
trying to democratise the ALP? It depends on your level of 
cynidsm. 
The cynical approach, adopted by Labour's 'hard Left' 
(symbolised by Tony Benn), sees the current proposals as 
creating a National Policy Forum which will be easier to 
amtrol than the party conference, and will turn oonference, 
tupposedly the supreme expression of democracy in the 
party, into a rubber stamp of the leadership and a pathetic 
carnival-much like the US Democratic Convention. There 
Is, indeed, a good deal to oommend this line of reasoning. 
The reform proposal documents are not shy in stating the 
Importance of the party oonference to the electoral image 
and the need to keep the opinion polls in mind each 
October. 
However, the Bennite hard Left should be the first to realise 
the weaknesses of the current policy-making structure. In 
1974 the third Wilson government was elected with a 
policy manifesto largely written by Benn himself which 
stressed the need for sweeping public control, ownership 
and democratisation of industry. However, within a short 
period of time Prime Minister Wilson had shunted him 
lideways into the Department of Energy and effectively 
lhelved the party program. Members of the ALP need no 
leesons on how easy it is for Cabinet not only to ignore but 
contradict totally policy that is formulated by one-off 
'binding' party conferences. 
A less cynical approach would be to look at the inade-
quacies of policy-making in both the Labour Party and the 
ALP. Policy, it is argued, is often hastily thrown together, 
not fully thought out in terms of the practicalities of financ-
ing and implementation, and motions passed often repre-
aent face-saving compromises full of internal 
contradictions or attempts to shelve debate on a politically 
damaging area without really resolving the issue. 
Labour's national platform committees face enormous 
pressure from factional leaders and cabinet members to 
produce suitably bland and moderate policy. Debates at 
conference become largely meaningless because the out-
anne is already known. In fact, rather than being an ex-
pression of party democracy, conferenoo degenerates into 
a forum for the leadership to affirm their right to ignore its 
decisions and to implement policy emanating largely from 
the business community and the press. 
We must come to grips with the fact that leaders will 
always reserve the right to ignore party policy. This is 
because, whether party members like it or not, the oom-
munity palpably does not accept the principle that parties 
should have a veto over the decisions of elected legislators 
and governors. In their eyes, party policy does not have the 
requisite amount of democratic legitimacy to bind parlia-
ments and governments. How do we give it greater 
legitimacy? This is the question which must be addressed 
by members of reforming parties who feel outraged by 
their governments' continual reoords of 'betrayal'. Some 
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answers can be found in the British Labour Party's 
proposed reforms. Others require us to go beyond those 
measures to explore new ways of merging the ALP more 
closely with the progressive elements in the oommunity. 
Firstly, policy must be aimed primarily at solving the· 
problems at hand and not just at reconciling factional 
differences. We should seek to move towards the structures 
of European social democratic parties where policy is 
made on an ongoing basis by large elected standing com-
mittees or forums and ratified, amended or rejected by full 
party oonferences. 
A second measure that should be investigated, and which 
goes further than those proposed for the British Labour 
Party, is calling for large scale community involvement in 
the policy making process. The community feels hostile to 
thededsionsof parties as opposed to those of governments 
partly because it rightly perceives that it has no input into 
these decisions which directly affect their lives if imple-
mented. 
Another possible measure and this will probably be 
rejected outright by many members is the inclusion of 
non-party members on the party policy committees. 
The reasons for opposition to this idea are obvious. It 
seems, on the face of it, undemocratic. But, of course, party 
policy is already heavily influenced by non-party sour-
ces-mostly conservative ones. It's obvious that the leader-
ship at national conference is far more concerned with the 
opinions of the journalists, media entrepreneurs and 
finance markets than with the internal opposition within 
the party. The growing influence of hired electoral, market-
ing and advertising oonsultants is also manifest Given that 
not all environmental, welfare, media, eoonomics and 
other experts are interested in membership of a political 
party, we should think of ways of involving them, taking 
advantage of their specialised knowledge and reaching out 
to large groups of people not yet directly involved in the 
political process. Their influence can be prevented from 
becoming excessive; they would remain invited allies, 
helping the ALP harness support from areas which should 
be the natural territory. 
On a more philosophical level, perhaps it's time for the 
ALP, as for British Labour, to get away from the vanguar-
dist notion of a political party. Internal party democratisa-
tion is important but is not enough. A total lack of internal 
party democracy certainly hasn't hindered the British Con-
servatives in winning successive elections and implement-
ing a radical reform program. We should, as a social 
democratic or democratic socialist guiding principle, be 
looking to involve the whole community in the political 
process, in democratising society at large. Events in East-
em Europe have proved that socialism or social democracy 
is doomed unless this occurs. 
DENNIS GLOVER formerly worked for the Victorian 
Trades Hall CounciL He is now a research student at King's 
Collegt-, Cambridge. 
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LA Kissing 
From invisibility to prime-time LA lilw: 
Jenni Millbank muses on the media's lesbian 
flirtation. 
There are no lesbians on television. It 
used to be the Golden Rule. Well, there 
was the occasional, passing reference 
on a Wednesday or Saturday night 
movi~ minor character, or an in-
sult, or a joke. Think hard now; there 
was Cher in Silkwood, Meryl Streep in 
Manhattan, Cathy Tyson in Mona Lisa. 
The lesbian relationship in The Color 
Purple was much downplayed-
Steven Spielberg jt:Istified it by saying 
he wanted to make a film people 
would "go to see": ie, a film about 
black people and not about lesbians, 
whereas, in fact, Alice Walker's book 
was about black lesbians. The Hunger 
had an ill-fated but tasty fling between 
Susan Sarandon and Catherine 
Deneuve; but you didn't see much be-
cause of those damn billowing white 
curtains, and anyway it was OK be-
cause one of them was a vampire. 
Ditto the simmering look and three-
second 'afterwards' scene between 
Jodie Foster and Nastassia Kinski in 
The Hatel New Hampshire. Jodie was a 
sexual assault survivor and Nastassia 
thought she was a bear; they both 
returned to the straight and narrow 
within about ten minutes of movie 
time; what more can you say? 
In Good Morning Vietnam Robin Wil-
liams made a joke about women in 
comfortable shoes, and in Julia Jane 
Fonda decked a guy and then threw a 
table on him just to be sure he got the 
message when he said that she and 
Vanessa Redgrave were lovers. (They 
weren' t Surprise). 
I'm sure there are a few more ex-
amples but, in 15 or 20 years of Hol-
lywood filmmaking, I don't really 
consider that much of an attempt. As 
for the made-for-TV genre the pick-
ings are slimmer still. To my memory 
there have only been a few. In about 
1980 there was a lesbian air hostess on 
Skyways (an Australian soapie, rather 
like Young Doctors but with air hostes-
ses and pilots instead of nurses and 
doctors). Around that time, Prisoner 
hit the screen, too, with a long-running 
violent, sadistic prison guard Joan Fer-
guson and short-lived violent, sadistic 
(but misunderstood) inmate Frankie. 
In 1983 two lesbians who'd left their 
husbands and were raising kids 
together were interviewed on Faces of 
Change (a series of documentaries 
about Australian women) and in 1989 
Gwen, a secretary on LA Law, revealed 
that Sam, her lover, whom she spoke 
to frequently on the phone was not the 
chap they'd thought she was. Interest-
ingly, in both Skyways and LA Law 
(made nearly ten years apart) the char-
acter's lesbianism is only revealed 
when a male character-her boss-
makes a pass at her and she has to 
explain her rejection of him (as though 
a heterosexual woman in the cir-
cumstances would have had no 
'excuse'). 
Now, in the last four or five months 
we've been flooded with dykes on 
telly and I, for one, don't quite know 
what to do with it. Vixens (a group of 
lesbian motorcyclists) appeared on 
Hinch to talk about their anti-gay-
bashing patrols of inner city Sydney. 
'IWo lesbians who were denied access 
to a Sydney hospital's fertility pro-
gram appeared on Sixty Minutes. Or-
ganisers of a recent lesbian festival 
and a lesbian conference appeared on 
Good Morning Australia to publicise the 
events (and were asked, incidentally, 
how their parents had 'coped' with 
their lesbianism). Then GP featured 
two lesbians seeking access to an lVF 
program and having a relationship 
crisis about who was going to be the 
birth-mother and who the co-parent. 
So who are these women, these les-
bians? Victims of violence, vigilantes, 
sadists, mothers, frustrated would-be 
mothers and creative, energetic 
women who organise cultural and 
political events for thousands of their 
kind but nevertheless broke their 
parents' hearts. 
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Oh,and they're lawyers, too. Yes, July 
saw the height of all things TV les-
bian-LA Law's latest and greatest 
(and thwarted) affair between CJ and 
Abbey. First they were friends-then 
"The Kiss that Shocked America". 
Well, maybe it shocked American hets; 
I'm sure American dykes found ita tad 
disappointing: 2.8 seconds and no 
sign of any tongue. Still, it was the first 
'lesbian' kiss filmed for television and 
hundreds of thousands of us were 
glued to our TV sets to see herstory in 
the making. Then there was the in-
evitable rejection and assertions of 
hetero- and bisexuality (Abbey and CJ 
respectively) and, over the next six 
weeks (yep, it got me hooked) we had 
the re-establishment of the friendship, 
some sexual jealousy, a date or two-
finally!-Abbey telling CJ she's ready 
now. Granted, it was presumptuous, 
but only a male scriptwriter with in· 
structions about the advertisers 
would have made CJ reject her in such 
clear terms ("consider yourself two 
things: dumped and relieved" for 
those of you who haven't memorised 
it after several viewings on the VCR). 
Now LA Law was great and fun, and 
probably the most watched 2.8 
seconds of television ever screened, 
but I think it's worth thinking about 
the images we're seeing, who is 
making them and what it means for 
lesbians. 
So what was good about it? Well, it 
made lesbians visible, it put women 
who were attracted to each other on 
screen in front of millions of people. It 
forced straight people to think about 
it. Lesbianism became 'topical'-by 
which I mean it was on the agenda for 
once without us having to raise it 
also confronted the myth 
heterosexuals are so fond of: that 
can spot a lesbian, any lesbian, at 
distance of several hundred metra·~• 
and there's never any doubt 
In that sense, although Abbey's 
CJ' s instantaneous disavowals of 
bianism were wishy-washy, 
were also some positive elements 
the scene. You had no \AT!>'nn•m 
never would have """ .. ' "~-"~'"' 
goes to show that you can't make 
sumptions ... 
myth the 2.8 seconds 
rather nicely was that of the 
lesbian-short-haired, con-
experienced, a tad manipula-
'unfeminine'-seducing a 
woman who is the opposite of 
above. It started off that way, 
q initiating the kiss, but from 
on in it was femmy old Abbey 
all of the chasing. 
ln.ttu•nnor~. as in any stereotype, 
of truth from which 
herminatea; a hell of a lot of women 
straight, even homophobic, until 
lleir attitudes are questioned and they 
options which they pre-
didn't see as possible. And so, 
in that sense, lesbianism is 
your mother always feared: con-
Maybe, after all, Abbey's a 
Law also broke down the 
dichotomy that is so 
part of heterosexual romantic 
mvthology. As though one either is 
or isn't, makes a successful 
or never speaks to the person 
as though there is no room for 
or for a continuum of feeling and 
Abbey and CJ care about each 
and are attracted to each other, 
in a relationship which will 
CDntinue whether or not they become 
_ and perhaps most important-
it was not 'the lesbian episode' nor 
'the lesbian episodes' or 
'leries'-it's going to continue well 
Into the new series later in the year. So, 
this case at least, lesbians are not just 
interest episode, or an exotic 
on and off again in an hour 
that covers us for another few 
''Dumped and relieved" was a 
it's not the end of the story. 
Now, before I start to sound all aglow 
with the LA Law lesbian revolution, 
there were a lot of problems with the 
program, as well as deeper issues that 
relate to images of lesbians in the 
malestream. Lesbians have been 
rendered invisible for so long now, 
that to be portrayed, and portrayed at 
aD positively, is a novel and exciting 
evenl However, I can't help the cynic 
lnmeasking'Whynow?" and 'What 
nextr' 
Interestingly, the word lesbian has not 
been uttered on screen. Neither has 
'bisexual'. TV Week used 'gay' and 
Woman's Day 1esbian' (followed by 
'shock' and 'shocker' respectively), 
but on the show itself 'flexible' was as 
daring as they gol So what's themes-
sage? Maybe it's OK to feel it, but not 
to name it. Lesbianism has become a 
ratings scoop, but it's still a dirty 
word. 
A more subtle but perhaps more 
alarming issue is that of rontextualisa-
tion. Any item of news or media 
gathers meaning from the items or is-
sues which surround it. 
Homosexuality has long been as-
sociated with mental illness, being a 
registered psychiatric disorder until 
1979, and still regarded by many as a 
sign of 'maladjustment'. Now, I don't 
know if the show's creators put that 
much thought into it, but it just hap-
pens that in both episodes with ex-
plicit lesbian content (The Kiss and 
The Date) there was a subplot of 
severe mental illness. With The Kiss 
there was a concurrent storyline in-
volving the trial for murder of a man 
with multiple personalities (all of 
them fairly unattractive). Weeks later 
when The Date screened there was the 
judge who ended up shooting himself 
because of a degenerative mental ill-
ness. The parallels may have been sub-
conscious but nevertheless oonvey a 
dangerous homophobic meaning. 
To return to more apparent flaws; both 
characters are thin, white, attractive, 
able-bodied, upper-middle class 
professionals. (The same criticism can 
be made of the two women on GP 
who, what's more, 'weren't 
separatists', 'had nothing against 
men' and 'would provide a male role 
model for the child whatever sex'.) 
The message? If you have to be a les-
bian, then be as much of a success at 
everything else of importanoe as you 
can. So we have tame lesbians, accept-
able ones. In reply it's often argued 
that to portray lesbians as short, chub-
by and crop-haired is to reinforce a 
tired old stereotype. So it's quite a 
Catch 22; either lesbians are'feminine' 
or we're 'butch'--either way we're 
fitted into narrow constructions of 
what women are, that we have no part 
in building. Hence attractive or ugly 
are the only choices women have in 
malestream portrayals and the image 
is oppressive either way. But why not 
non-Anglo or working class and 
'attractive'? I cannot recall ever seeing 
a non-Anglo lesbian on television. 
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Whatis thepolntofbrakingdown one 
stereotype if it helps to build up 
another? All lesbians are not White 
and White lesbians should not accept 
the domination of images of White 
women as if it is 'all we can expect' or 
'a start'. 
In other words, should lesbians settle 
back and feel satisfied to have found 
our niche in patriarchal culture? The 
networks finally realise there's an un-
tapped market (LA Law's ratings were 
their highest ever on the night of the 
kiss, and there is some speculation 
that the beginning of another series 
hinged on that), the heterosexual 
viewing public decide to be interested 
or voyeuristic or liberal-and lesbians 
get a guest spot on a variety of 1V 
shows, as long as we abide by the rest 
of the rules. I wonder, do lesbians real-
ly want that? Do we want, for ex-
ample, to have advertising targeted at 
us? It disturbs me, I must admit, to 
think of lesbian feminists dashing 
down to the local newsagent to buy 
TV Week to see if there's going to be a 
date next episode, and Woman's Day 
because Amanda Donohoe was seen 
kissing Cecil Hoffman in an LA 
nightclub. Buying magazines one has 
sheer contempt for and rationalising 
in the process; well, I know it supports 
the monarchy and female braindeath 
and capitalism and is full of evil diets 
but, hell, it has got a lovely close-up 
picture of Amanda in those boots. 
Notthat I'm attacking those of us who 
did just that-after all, my press clip-
pings are right up there with the best 
of them. I'm just saying that visibility 
is the first step on a long path towards 
even the most basic ctvil rights, and at 
each step it is important to measure 
just what is being lost and what is 
being gained. 
I, for one, don't want an outhouse of 
tolerance tacked onto the edge of 
someone else's culture. I want our 
own culture. Images of ourselves that 
we create and control, that reflect our 
diversity and experienoe, that don't 
trap us into suffocatingly narrow con-
structions of femininity. Images I can 
feel proud of. Images that don't have 
advertisement breaks. 
JENNI MILLBANK is a Sydney 
freelance writer. 
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Into Cyberspace 
McKenzie Wark looks at the utopias of the new 
postindustrial science fiction. 
"Program a map to display 
frequency of data exchange, 
every thousand megabytes a 
single pixel on a very large 
screen. Manhattan and Atlan-
ta bum solid white. Then 
they start to pulse, the rate of 
traffic threatening to over-
load your simulation. Your 
map is about to go nova. Cool 
it down. At a hundred million 
megabytes per second, you 
begin to make out certain 
blocks in midtown Manhat-
tan, outlines of hundred-year 
old industrial parts ringing 
the core of Atlanta. .. " 
This is how William Gibson, leading 
writer of the cyberpunk revolution in 
pop science fiction writing, visualises 
the landscape wrought upon the 
world by the second great wave of the 
industrial revolution. It is an imagi-
nary description of an emergent ter-
rain for both politics and culture. 
Science fiction is the great pop litera-
ture of the first wave of the industrial 
revolution: machinery and rationality 
were its material; speed and power 
were its obsessions. This was also the 
material which much of the modern 
movement worked upon. Hence 
modem art and science fiction can be 
viewed as two distinct but connected 
cultural levels within the first machine 
age. As with much of avant garde art, 
the dominant threads of sci-fi narra-
tive were projection and teleology. 
They threw into the future an image of 
a coherent aspect of the present, which 
was subsequently depicted in either a 
utopian or distopian light. 
The great socialist critic Raymond Wil-
liams has pointed out that the utopian 
wing of science fiction also had strong 
connections with the socialist move-
ment. William Morris wrote his 
utopian vision of the future, News from 
Nowhere, as a response to what he 
thought were the overtly statist and 
technocratic visions of another 
socialist utopian, Edward Bellamy. 
More recently, there have been at-
tempts to revive the utopian novel as 
a feminist genre by Ursula Le Guin, 
Marge Piercy and Joanna Russ, not to 
mention Callenbach's Ecotopill. Never-
theless, this is not a dominant trend. 
Writing in the American magazine 
Socialist Reuiew, Andrew Ross has ar-
gued in favour of a revival of left-
utopian vision. However, it is 
questionable whether there is really an 
avid public for such imaginings. 
Political culture, like religious culture 
before it, seems to be going through an 
intense and disillusioning process of 
'secularisation'. Forms of fiction 
which imagine how the technologies 
of today will affect the political and 
cultural terrain of tomorrow, and 
project local and partial tactics for 
dealing with it, seem more the order of 
the day. 
This is where the cyberpunk literature 
can be useful. Cyberpunk is an at-
tempt to revolutionise the sci-fi genre 
and create a pop literature appropriate 
to the postmodem world. Where sci-fi 
was historically determinist and 
projective, utopian or dystopian, 
cyberpunk writing tends to occupy a 
flat information landscape, where 
grand historical meta-narratives have 
ceased to give a purchase on the real. 
William Gibson gives historical ex-
planations linking his cyberspace 
present to our present, but casually, as 
if the development of cyberspace had 
altered the very tracks of history itself. 
The passage of time is registered more 
in memory. History appears in 
Gibson's novels in the jumble of old 
and new brand names and products, 
in the juxtaposition of dirty back alleys 
with gleaming new facades. 
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Gibson's labyrinthine landscapes of 
the postmodern city are neither 
utopian nor dystopian but, rather, to 
misuse a term of Foucault's, 
heterotopian. Spaces are juxtaposed 
against each other; the lush hotel 
against downtown funk; the byzan· 
tine mansion against the spiritual 
colony. Overlaid upon this heterotopic 
jungle is the atopia of cyberspace. This 
is the no-place, the locus sol us of pure 
data, no longer even language, the 
'consensual hallucination' connecting 
those with power to each other. The 
heterotopic world of the street, full of 
grifters and drifters and data-cowboys 
is a space for a new underclass, cut off 
from the speed and velocity of 
cyberspace. Yet within cyberspace a 
still more disturbing hierarchy rules 
where all-too-human uses of the data-
nets find themselves outwitted by ar· 
tificial centres of intelligence. 
The pathos of this postmodem sci.ft 
comes from the fact that it is 
monstrous great Hl<ll'-'11'"'"'"· proaucr•IIJI• 
our reason and labour, have be-
come a power of our reason and 
labour. Rather, the virus of int<lrma.• 
tion, lucid or hallucinatory, 
product of our unconscious 
and play as much as reason 
labour, has been woven into a 
which our subjectivity now plays 
itself. We no longer have roots, 
have aerials. Even our 
ogyhas been 
tion technology. The old aesthet• 
philosophical and political connsod• 
tions between reason and tec.tmoliOAl 
have been severed. Technology 
surreal concept, demanding a 
Freudian psychopathology 
nothing to do with reductive 
of the family. 
By grasping the impact of ,fn,rm••HI 
technology on the ...... "vu.:>uiJu", 
since J G Ballard and, 
Gibson, turns the 
literary device for 
guage that is fully 
surrealism, but which does 
the myth of the avant garde to 
its experiments. Gibson's work is 
within the pop mainstream. 
it plays with realism and 
takes place within. New literary 
devices, disguised as sd-fi technology, 
allow the exploration of new regions 
of connection between language, sub-
jectivity and the real. Gibson's par-
tirular novelty lies in dreaming up 
new information technologies and 
new medical technologies and quite 
'literally' grafting them together 
within the body. Hence his work can 
support a double reading, as writing 
about subjectivity itself, using these 
technical devices as literary devices. 
Here a deliberately impoverished 
etyle of writing contains a wealth of 
1echnique. 
Thebestwritingin the new cyberpunk 
pnre is without a doubt contained in 
Gibson's three novels: Neuromancer, 
Count Zero and Mona Lisa Overdrive, 
and some of his short stories collected 
~ Burning Chrome. (Two useful an-
thologies are Mirrorshades, edited by 
Bruce Sterling and the sci-fi issue of 
Slmiotext[e], No. 14. Not much of the 
cyberpunk literature is up to the 
llandard of Gibson's, but these two 
anthologies provide a representative 
eample from which the reader can 
make her or his own judgments.) Also 
of interest is the work of Sol Yurick, 
best known for his novel The Warriors 
and his non-fiction essay Metatron 
(published by Semiotext[e] in their 
Foreign Agents Series). His hal-
lucinatory novel on the Kennedy as-
sassination theme, Richard A and his 
story in the Semiotext(e) anthology are 
also recommended. Rudy Rucker's 
Software and Wetware novels, while 
not as erudite as Yurick's or as crafted 
as Gibson's, are written by someone a 
little more technologically literate. All 
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in all, a liberal dose of this literature 
ought to provide a glimpse of what 
may become the pop imaginary of the 
near future. In the words of Alan 
Moore's fabulous graphic novel, The 
Watchmen, "a world of impending ex-
otica, glimpsed only peripherally". 
McKENZIE WARK teaches in 
computing at Macquarie University. 
Australian Psycho? 
In mid-August a 33-year old man by the name of 
Waite Frankum ran amok with a semi-automatic 
rifle in the main shopping plaza of the Sydney 
suburb of Strathfield, killing seven people. Police 
were reported to be disturbed by his 
'ordinariness', and unable to find an explanation 
for the sudden outburst of random violence. 
I bad met Frankum, after a fashion, a 
i!w months before. He was driving 
-flxis, and I had caught his cab to my 
lane in BondL It was a late evening, 
.JDd I was tired and disinclined to talk 
much. He mentioned that until recent-
;jyhe had been living in Bondi, not too 
:6r from my own flat As he told the 
llory, he had owned a clothing store in 
Bondi, and had mortgaged his house 
to raise the capital for it. The store had 
failed, and the bank had repossessed 
the house. He now lived in Strathfield, 
with his sister, and was driving taxis 
while he tried to put his life together. 
The conversation stayed in my mind, 
more for the way it had been con-
ducted than what had been said. 
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Hundreds of small businesses have 
gone bankrupt, since this recession 
began to bite, and people's lives fall 
apart all the time. What struck me 
most about this individual cir-
cumstance, however, was the way my 
taxi-driver talked about the situation. 
His manner was preoccupied, his 
voice was flat and matter-of-fact; it 
was almost as if he was talking about 
the misfortunes of a third, absent, per-
son. I attempted to respond sym-
pathetically, but he seemed almost not 
to hear. 
I remember most of all the end of our 
conversation. We had arrived at my 
flat, and I payed him. I got out and 
wished him good luck. He answered -
I don't remember what he said - and 
drove off. But it was obvious that what 
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I had said had not registered in his 
mind. He was too sunk within his own 
malaise. 
When I reflected on this conversation 
the day following the 'Strathfield 
massaae', as one of the papers called 
it, several things occurred to me. Frrst, 
as the police had initally, bemusedly, 
acknowledged, my taxi-driver had 
seemed a prefectly ordinary person. 
He showed no outward signs of ag-
gressiveness. He evidenced no ob-
vious anger or bitterness towards Mr 
Keating, or the banks,or the unions,or 
any other ha~figure, for his troubles. 
He drove far more carefully than the 
majority of taxi-drivers. In a~ce 
and demeanour he seemed cautious, 
controlled, predse, respectable. 
The conventional explanation of 
'serial killers' or other supposed 
'psychopaths' is that there is so~ 
thing 'wrong' with them, something 
which marks them off from most of 
their fellows. Preferably, they should 
have had an unhappy childhood, an 
unnatural fixation, a deep-seated 
grudge or sense o~ t:'ate. I coul~ n?t 
imagine any sigruf1cant respcet m 
which my taxi-drivers' coniersation 
or reactions would have distinguished 
him from any other of many 
thousands of similar middle-aged 
Australian males. Newspaper reports, 
gras~ at a sign of psychopathy, 
repo the suggestion that his unit 
contained 'a large collection of violent 
magazines and books', and, in par-
ticular, a copy of the novel American 
Psycho. The former could, I suspect, be 
said in one way or another of every 
second adolescent male in suburban 
Australia, while American Psycho is 
reportedly an international bestseller. 
H that made my taxi-driver a 'psycho', 
hundreds of thousands of Australian 
males are 'psychos' too. 
It is easy to be glib about this, and 
indeed feminists and the Left some-
times are rather glib about the wellspr-
ings of male violence in general, as 
opposed to its specific manifestations. 
Rather than say: my taxi-driver was 
violent in the way that hundreds of 
thousands of Australian males are 
potentially or actually violent, I would 
prefer to put the outc?m~ of t;lY 
musings about that taxi-dnver hke 
this. 
Here was a man who had been treated 
to little luck by life, and who seemed 
to feel deadened and defeated by the 
experience. (In addition to his per-
sonal misfortunes, I discovered from 
the newspapers, his father had died 
recently, and his mother had com-
mitted suidde in loneliness not long 
after.) This is a feeling common to so 
many people, male and female, for its 
extent to be impossible even to guess 
at. 
The spedfic factor which ~gni~~ 
this problem for him was his mab1lity 
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to communicate the fact, or to express 
it to others in a way which might make 
it real to them, too- a ~lem which 
is so typiCally male iJt our~~ as 
almost to be reasonably described as a 
'male' one. In his/ inability to com-
municate, to int~ract with other 
people emotionally in even the most 
apparently innocent, conversational 
ways about his loss of self-respect and 
purpose, he cut himself off. His refuge 
was a fantasy world which happened, 
it would appear, to involve fantasies 
of violence towards other people. 
Within that fantasy world little conse-
quence was placed upon the happen-
ings in the outsi?e world. T~e 
violence, then, was m a sense an m· 
cidental outcome of the emotional 
paralysis which dominated his rela-
tion to his life's predicament. 
All of this is not a case for or against 
tighter gun laws (though I pe~nally 
happen to feel them a good thing), or 
in favour of or against any straightfor-
ward policy response by which a 
government could reasonably 
respond to such an occurance. 
NJr, in any simple sense, does it help 
to 'explain' male violence in general 
A great many young me~ in this 
society are undoubtedly qwte happy 
to hit, bash or rape to express hatred 
or anger, whether against women in 
particular or life in general, and 
probably make little effort to repress 
the fact. In many if not most cases they 
may go throughout life causing 
surprisingly little mayhem. My taxi-
driver on the other hand, did not seem 
a 'violent man', yet seven familia~ 
were in grief. 
Perhaps that is why media and poHCI 
alike need to 'discover' the 
psychopath in people who oommitt 
killings like those of Waite Frankum. 
What if it were not only psychopathic 
men who killed like this - nor evea, 
come to that, apparently violent men? 
The strangest emotion I found ill 
myself welled up a few days after the 
killings. As the psychopathic chaJ'ao. 
ter began to tak~ shape in the ~ntilluo 
ing media scrutiny, I felt a wen'Ci urp 
to defend the ordinariness of a mall 
murderer. 
DAVID BURCHELL is ALR'I 
managing editor. 
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Power Politics 
iet~ing Power by Stuart Rees, 
& Unwin 1991. Reviewed by 
•talk Bolun and Jan Breckm-
P· 
art Rees has attempted a 
ambitious project to bring 
sether various facets of 
. experience which result 
· empowering individuals and 
ps. He has succeeded in 
tifying several processes 
ch have an empowering ef-
but the breadth of this in-
has necessarily resulted 
~renerally superficial treat-
example, his thoughts on the use 
· biography, while interesting, do not 
tend the reader's knowledge 
what was achieved by early 
'smovementstrategiesforem-
erment such as consciousness-
sing groups. Rees describes 
phy as a means by which sense 
be made of one's life, but this 
1111!18bow descends into an injunction 
write. The few examples and quotes 
m eminent persons who have 
writing therapeutic does little 
mnvince the reader of the sug-
power of the pen. It is also un-
how biography muld be of equal 
to all people and groups. By hint-
ing that this concept has universal ap-
plication Rees aeated the necessity to 
outline the real difficulties involved in 
applying the concept aaoss different 
IIW'Kinalised groups. In fact, this is 
touched on briefly, but certainly not in 
the depth required. 
The discussion of economic 
rationalism and social justice is by far 
the easiest section of the book to read; 
perhaps Rees is more oomfortable in 
dealing with large-scale issues of em-
powerment or soda! justice than those 
at the local level, or in explaining the 
various steps of empowerment rather 
than how they all fit together as a 
world view. 
But Rees struggles throughout the 
book to establish empowerment as a 
theory in itself. We remained uncon-
vinced that empowerment is anything 
more than a theoretical con-
cept/ strategy contained in many so-
cial theories (although admittedly 
differently defined in each). The im-
portance given to empowerment by 
Rees is certainly not in dispute. But his 
'theory' fails to oope with the basic 
difficulty- that different people and 
groups perceive empowerment and 
use empowerment strategies dif-
ferently. 
Rees aitidses the limitations of con-
sensus-based sodal theory and prac-
tice yet his book ultimately falls into 
this same category. His processes of 
empowerment appear oriented to 
renegotiating I arbitrating ine-
qualities, without addressing the fun-
damental structural sources of power 
and powerlessness in sodety. The re-
quired skills Rees identifies are at best 
tentatively linked to empowerment, 
and one wonders at their inclusion. 
They appear to be those skills neces-
sary for any good sodal work practice: 
evaluation, p~tion, ~t 
planning and administration, formal 
negotiation and advocacy. The di!lalS-
sion of these skills focuses on social 
workers, rather than upon their 
clients, as one may have expected 
from an empowerment theory. 
The book as a whole falls between 
being a commitment to sodal justice, 
a condemnation of economic 
rationalism and an attempt to en-
oourage the further politidsation of 
sodal work and sodal welfare stu-
dents and practitioners. Some interest-
ing and challenging ideas are 
presented but are rarely developed 
enough to allow the reader to feel 
stirred to respond or act. This is a 
shame as surely empowerment is 
about stirring people to respond or 
act. 
NATALIE BOLZAN and JAN 
BRECKENRIDGE teach in IOdal work 
at the Univenity of NSW. 
He Told the Truth 
eall know politicians lie. Lennon sang: MYou have to to smile as you ldlJ, if you to be like the folks on the tnJ•. But those politicians who 
become 'king of the castle' on 
Capitol Hill usually lack skills 
in statecraft; we soon find their 
charm transparent. 
After their political honeymoon as 
new leaders, they rarely persuade us 
that they differ much from 'the dirty 
rascals', that they do genuinely 
believe in espoused ideals, or hold any 
ooherent vision of a better future. 
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The memoirs of the recently retired 
Swedish Treasurer, Kjeli-Olof Feldt, 
persuade me that he genuinely 
believes in the ideals which he 
espoused when he dominated the 
Swedish political scene. I am per-
suaded of this by the openness with 
which he admits to his part in the 
skulduggery of politics in Sweden in 
the 1980s. He details his part in the 
making and breaking of the 1988 elec-
tion promises of the Swedish Sodal 
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Democratic Party (SAP) and he out-
lines endless rounds of tough negotia-
tions without omitting the double 
dealing and double crossing in which 
he engaged just as much as did the 
opposition parties' leaders, his cabinet 
comrades, and the party's trade union 
'Friends'. (These union leader Friends 
are very often treated to ironic 
capitalisation.) No one exposes them-
selves to this extent unless they sin-
cerely do believe in some larger cause. 
When I read Feldt's fascinating revela-
tions about the harsh realities of con-
temporary parliamentary politics, it 
was Gramsci's 'Jacobinist' interpreta-
tion of Machiavelli, as a passionate, 
even somewhat moral, believer in the 
ideals of absolutist monarchy in large 
centralised states which came to mind. 
In Gramsd's view, Machiavelli was 
essentially democratic because he 
revealed the beastly side of the noble 
art of statecraft not primarily for an 
exclusive readership of princes, but 
primarily as an eye-opener for the 
masses. Feldt's account of political 
machinations uncovers a passionate 
belief in the historical tradition of 
popular mobilisation within the 
Swedish labour movement, and it can 
similarly be read as a publication 
designed to open the eyes of a wide 
readership. 
But Feldt's understanding of 
mobilisation might read: "if leaders 
frankly articulate recognisable 
problems more people will actively 
involve themselves in solving their 
problems". Of course, much of the 
Swedish labour movement disagrees 
with his understanding of the "move-
ment tradition", just as most union 
movements around the world have 
disagreed with the public expendi-
ture-cutting and deflationary policy 
directions of treasurers within govern-
ments of labour in the 1980s. Trade 
unions must adhere to a practicable 
vision of a just society with which to 
inspire their members, if there is to be 
any meaning in describing themselves 
as a labour movement Hopefully, the 
effort Feldt has made to explain the 
grounds for the way he put his con-
ventional'economic rationalism' into 
practice will inspire his critics to ran-
sack their own ideological conscien-
ces. Perhaps then we will be treated to 
a fuller understanding of the tradi-
tions behind what is both electorally 
and organisationally the most success-
ful labour movement in the world. 
Ideological honesty became crucially 
problematic for Feldt, as he con-
cluded: "My political problem came to 
be the way I expressed myself, more 
brutally than others, when I 
demanded review of current 
doctrines. At the same time !-per-
haps too impatiently-sought con-
crete results from such a review. This 
led bourgeois commentators to 
describe me as a renewalist and an 
agitator while those who described 
themselves as 'the Left' thought I was 
a closet liberal and leader of the so-
called chancellery Right. In any case, 
no one called me a grey social 
democrat any longer." Since Feldt's 
resignation his successor has 
managed to implement several of the 
reforms to scale down public spend-
ing for which he had long struggled. 
Feldt therefore wonders whether his 
own penchant for fran1c:ness hindered 
rather than furthered ideological 
renewal within the labour movement 
The people I spoke to in the months 
after these best-selling memoirs were 
published in Sweden in April, were 
divided over whether Feldt had 
harmed or aided the party's chances in 
the upcoming September elections. 
Was Feldt contributing to the long-
term intellectual respectability of the 
labour movement? Or was he kicking 
the party when it was seriously down 
in the opinion polls by revealing how 
promises were made so rashly in the 
lead-up to the previous elections, and 
then broken in the subsequent year? If 
a treasurer is to resign ol his own ac-
cord then the least disruptive and 
most common time to go is in mid-
term, which is what Feldt did. But it is 
most unusual for a treasurer to write a 
'kiss-and-tell' autobiography a year 
later, only six months before the sub-
sequent elections. 
Party branch members and local trade 
union officials in Stockholm mostly 
agree that Feldt's warts-and-all ac-
count of perennial problems in balanc-
ing budgets and restraining wage 
increases along the Social Democrats' 
'Third Way' (between inflationary 
Keynesian expansion and harsh 
Thatcherite contraction), has con-
tributed to the intellectual respect-
ability of the labour movement 
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Others, such as secretary of the Sodal 
Welfare Department, Sture Korpi, and 
retired union economist GOsta Rehn 
(the architect of the famous 
'solldaristic' wages policy) thought 
Feldt had only harmed the party. The 
Department of Social Welfare, becauae 
of its propensity to spend, and the 
unions, because of their 'irresponsible' 
wage demands, are recurrent targets 
for Feldt's bitterness over the fruitle~~­
ness of his struggle to stabilise the 
economy. 
Feldt resolutely pursues the failed 
factionalist's inclination to resurrect 
old issues and recount old slights. The 
memoirs' title comes from a couplet 
"All those days that came and went, I 
didn't know that was life." Ht 
recounts more than once how montbl 
of impossibly long days of intenll 
work within Treasury almost always 
ended in a failure to find the politic.l 
openings for doing what wu 
economically correct But he also ru. 
above the understandable tempta-
tions of the factionalist, to a <>"''QQ•-~• 
extent than his opponents 
him credit. 
Besides his interesting account of 
pressures journalists put on 
ments to make promises 
snappy headlines during 
campaigns, Feldt's memoirs 
probably most interest 
readers with his account of the 
tion, early success, and Pv,PntWI 
decline of the 'Third Way'. c1uriW1m 
in this account include: the 
debates leading up to the 'big 
devaluation of 16% immediately 
the Social Democrats came to 
1982; the unions' support for 
tion and their initial toleration of 
profits, high price increases, 
eroded real wages for the sake of 
tinuing to keep unemployment 
2-3%; Feldt's stormy relationship 
Olof Palme; the fortunate 
ment of a brewing ranik-anct··HJe~ re111 
lion against wage restraint 
Palme was murdered in 
1986; and the poorly gro•un~ded 
national accolades T1u 
and the OECD in 1987 for the 
of the 'Third Way'. 
There are two basic and related 
in Feldt's account of Swedish 
in the 1980s. The first is his 
and unsatisfactory account of 
troversial 'wage-earner funds' 
tion in 1983. The other is his 
total failure to explain the viewpoint 
of the blue-collar Swedish Trade 
Union Confederation, the LO, and ac-
muntfor his stormy relationship with 
the 1.0 leaders. A couple of times he 
-sgests that they were attempting to 
dictate government policy to the party 
J.ders, while they themselves had no 
Deed to concern themselves about 
facing re-election every third year. 
There are a great many references to 
his feud with LO leaders Stig Maim 
llld Rune Molin, and almost as many 
denigrations of the critical editorial 
line pursued by the tO-owned Af-
ltmbliuld (an evening tabloid with the 
11mnd largest circulation in Sweden). 
In the wake of financial deregulation, 
the international renaissance for 
private speculation swept through 
property and share markets in 
Sweden and elsewhere during 1987-
1990. But there Treasury attempts to 
restrain aggregate consumption, 
greatly fuelled by easy credit, met 
a!ntrally-placed resistance by union 
J.ders who caused Social Democratic 
leeders a great deal of heartburn. 
Feldt believes that Aftcmbladet's editor, 
the union leaders, and the rank and 
6le all adhere to an outdated statist 
Ylew of welfare reformism and dis-
tributive justice, a view which he 
believes misunderstands the complex 
relationship between capitalist 
Judy Horacek 
H~~ Koc.lc~, wa~ch 
"'t pull Q rqbl,;~ 
ou~h~ "'~ h4f ! 
production and incentive-generating 
distribution. But as his respectful critic 
COsta Rehn put it: "How could such 
an intelligent politician as Kjell-Olof 
Feldt not understand that the high 
profits fuelled by the 1982 devalua-
tion, and his continual calls for wage 
restraint, would put impossible 
strains on the unions and their 
leaders?" 
Feldt does tell us that towards the end 
of his period in office he realised that 
wages were increasing in the 1980s at 
about the same pace as they had in the 
1960s, so all the talk about the collapse 
of the Swedish model of industrial 
relations was uncalled for. The prob-
lem, as he sees it, lies in a general 
restructuring of the workforce away 
from manufacturing and towards ser-
vices. This has had a long-term 
detrimental effect on productivity 
growth. The economy can no longer 
afford both the same pace of wage in-
creases and costly new public reforms 
such as the 1988 election promises to 
extend parental leave benefits, to ex-
tend annual holidays, and to provide 
day-care centres for all pre-school 
children by 1991. Thus, whereas the 
long-standing Social Democratic 
treasurers of old had waged many a 
battle against those who would not 
accept no for an answer, he had been 
compellt4 to persuade cabinet Com-
rades and union Friends to actin ways 
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in which they did not want to ad: to 
reduce welfare spending and accept 
declining real wages. 
When the editor of Aftcmbl4dd 
reviewed Feldt's memoirs he quoted 
Feldt's review of British Labour Chan-
cellor of the Exchequer Denis Healey's 
memoirs. Of Healey, Feldt wrote that 
you should not read politidans' 
memoirs if you are interested in the 
truth. Aftcmbladet concluded that the 
same naturally applied to Feldt's 
memoirs; this was his truth as he un-
derstands it today. Union leader Stig 
Maim echoed this sentiment when 
reporters asked him for comments. All 
he would say was; "You'll have to wait 
until I retire and publish my 
memoirs". 
Perhaps then we will see an acoountof 
recent Swedish politics which 
counterbalances the former 
Treasurer's acoount and digs up the 
deep ideological roots of the union 
movement's highly controversial 
campaign for wage-earner invest-
ment funds. 
ANDREW VANDENBERG Uvecl in 
Stockholm for eeven yean up UDtil hi• 
recent return to Auetralla. He now 
teac:hee polltice at Mac:quarle 
Univenity. 
'.loops, tvtf~Mt~ 
~crct nuc/e4r 
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Cultural Commodities 
ALR's 'Local Cultures' supplement 
(ALR 130,July) takes a broad definition 
of 'culture': it is what counts as culture 
for thotle who participate in it. This 
definition would seem to have much to 
recommend it. It is inclusive and non-
evaluative, accommodates a diversity 
of intasts and values and avoids any 
impoeed and elitist notions of excel-
lence. 
From the viewpoint of pollcymaking, 
however, the difficulty in adopting this 
relativistic notion of culture is that 
there is no clear basis for deciding what 
kinds of cultural practices the state 
should support. How can one 'plan' 
for culture when it is such an all-en-
oompassing and elusive concept? 
The 'cultural industries' approach ad-
vocated by Gay Hawkins, Kathie Gib-
aon and Colin Mercer really represents 
a strategy for 'aelling' this broad oon-
cept of culture to hard-nosed planning 
and economic administrators who 
may not have given much thought to 
how culture may be integrated with 
IOdal and economic policy. The cul-
tural industries approach carries a 
number of inherent dangers which 
need cloee examination. 
For a start, the focus on the market that 
will inevitably restrict what oounts as 
culture. The overriding logic of the 
marketplace is the pursuit of profit, 
and the drive for profit leads to a focus 
on, and the oonstant attempt to create, 
a mass audience. While the idea of in-
dustry oonveys an image of a set of 
organised and broadly related ac-
tivities with a common orientation to 
the market, many 'cultural' activities 
either do not resemble components of 
an industry, at least as traditionally 
conceived, or they have limited value 
in the market. It is difficult to identify 
the common 'industrial' concerns of 
such diverse activities as Macedonian 
folkdandng, community choral per-
formances and graffiti 'art' and the 
demand for these products in the 
market is certainly restricted, but they 
all, nonetheless, meet the 'cultural 
needs' of their respective groups in-
sofar as they provide a vehicle for the 
expression of individual pleasure, 
group identity or life experience. 
In pursuing the cultural industries ap-
proach, there is the danger in being 
locked into an economic rationalist ar-
gument about the 'marketability' of 
particular cultural activities. Without 
doubt, the market has provided oppor-
tunities for many cultural producers 
and has created a broad range of cul-
tural products for the general popula-
tion. But it has to be recognised that 
this 'packaging' of culture for a mass 
audience tends to occur at the expense 
of minority cultural producers and 
consumers. Given the logic of the 'cul-
tural industries' approach, policy 
makers will always be disinclined to 
support the cultural pursuits of 
minority or fringe groups because they 
do not pay their way. 
Again, the idea of treating culture as a 
'thing' to be packaged and sold on the 
open market denies the intangible, yet 
very 'real' significance of cultural prac-
tices to the participants. It also turns 
one's attention from examining the 
moral content of cultural phenomena. 
Does one wish to promote cultural 
forms which are racist, sexist, and 
ageist, and so on, but which have high 
market value? 
As aspects of 'pub culture', female top-
less bartending and mud wrestling are 
popular (ie, have high market value) in 
Australian society, but they also help 
promote the view that women are 
merely sexual objects. The free market 
embodies no notion of justice or equity 
and, unless there is political will within 
the state to intervene in appropriate 
ways, the flow of capital to areas that 
generate highest profits will tend to 
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dictate 'cultural', as well as economic 
and social, priorities. 
All the 'Local Cultures' articles, in 
varying degrees, tend to attribute a 
'thing-like' quality to culture, whlch 
reflects a more general problem of 
many contemporary analyses of c:uJ. 
ture: the failure to inspect the economic 
and political processes underlying the 
production, promotion and consum~ 
tion of culture. 
Hawkins and Gibson suggest that c:uJ. 
tural planning is emerging as the 90s 
buzzword to replace cultural 
democracy as the new objective for 
local cultural development. If this is 10, 
then let us hope that local 'cultural 
planners' do not also abandon the c:uJ. 
tural democratic ethos that was begin-
ning to emerge in the 70s and 8011: 1 
primary concern with access, equity 
and participation. 
Alan Petenm, 
Curtin University of Technology, 
WA. 
Real World 
DearALR 
I wish to inform you that I will not be 
renewing my subscription to ALR. 
Quite frankly I fail to see the role which 
articles on Madonna (ALR. Augult 
1991) can play in the debate over 
strategies to defend the interests of 
working people. Nor am I aware of the 
connection between an alleged Sixtiel 
revival and the urgent need to buDd 1 
coalition of forces on the Left to chal-
lenge the Accordist policies of the 
Hawke Labor government and the 
ACI'U. ALR has become simply too 
indulgent and lifestyle-fixated to play 
any significant role in this project. 
As for the dross entitled "Correct lJDI 
Cooking'' and "Dr Hartman'", I caa 
only suggest that if ALR's editors caa 
drag themselves away from their~ 
pie terraces for a moment, they DUgllt 
discover that such feeble attempts at 
'humour' cut no ice with workiDa 
people out in the real world. 
~ 
lea. 
CORRECT 
LINE 
COOKING 
Penelope on 
Paprika 
llove people and books with a fixa-
tion or obsession. Pigeons, Lolitas, 
motorbikes or matchboxes, that sort 
of thing. I have already referred to a 
m .. ive and learned text about the 
potato in this column. Personally, I 
would love to focus my mind on one 
food or object long enough to write 
a book about it. In years, if not cen-
tadea, to come people would speak 
ID hushed tones about Cottier on 
CtumCJlkes or Penelope's Big Book of 
Cmots. It shows true intelligence to 
free the mind from the dross of 
everyday life and to concentrate ex-
clusively on a fruit or vegetable. 
In moments of quietude I dream of 
the book I would write if my mind 
were not of the grasshopper variety. 
And who knows, one day I may yet 
write the definitive tome on bananas. 
I would open with a chapter on 
myths surrounding the banana like a 
IICX)nd skin, from both a human and 
chimpanzee perspective. A serious 
(and mercifully brief) section on the 
United Fruit Company's geopolitical 
grasp on the desirable fruit would 
follow. I suppose I'd include some-
thing about the nasty practice of gass-
ing bananas to ripeness here, so that 
people a>Uld skip all the serious bits 
without too much trouble. Then we 
would slip into a discussion of the 
sexuality of the banana, its use in 
desserts and how to spot a limp one 
at 50 paces ... Such dreams enfold me 
as I cradle the yellow crescent in my 
hand. Unfortunately, my enthusiasm 
is not long-lived. 
No such problems of concentration 
afflict Zoftan HalAsz, author of The 
Little Book of Hungarian Paprika (Cor-
vina Publications, Budapest 1987). I 
located this modestly titled book in 
Acland Street, St I<ilda-which, 
given the cultural roots of the area, 
seems appropriate. I had just eaten an 
excellent Jewish/Russian meal and, 
barely able to walk, still managed to 
flick through rookbooks. My eye was 
caught by the red/ orange cover of 
the aforementioned text. In other 
words, the book is paprika-coloured. 
Even the pages are somewhat 
paprikaed, as ifMr HalAsz, unable to 
contain his enthusiasm for the 
blessed condiment, had sprinkled 
select amounts into the paper during 
manufacture. Unfortunately, the 
book does not smell of paprika-at 
least not until careless use by the 
reader remedies this lack. 
The Little Book of Hungarum Paprika 
delighted me. Section headings in-
clude "A simple history, with rom-
plications", "From magic potion to a 
source of vitamins" and "Is paprika 
really hot?" (The answer to the last 
question is: not necessarily, depend-
ing on the variety.) The illustrations 
show various happy Hungarians and 
capsicums performing unusual func-
tions, such as the latter (from which 
paprika comes) acting as the barrel of 
a cannon alongside a description of 
the really hot paprika. 
The recipes in this book arenotfor the 
faint-hearted, and certainly not for 
the vegetarian; even the fresh green 
bean soup is made with beef stock, 
for example. It may be that a really 
cold climate is necessary to ap-
preciate fully the passionate beauty 
of paprika in a meat stew. a will ig-
nore curry and Asia at this juncture.) 
However, why not experiment with 
the following soup, and hopefully 
disrover the reason for Zoltan's en-
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thusiasm. The recipe calls for "noble 
sweet paprika", which is one of the 
milder but flavoursome paprikas and 
can therefore be used in greater quan-
tities. 
Gulyas Soup 
Ingredients: SOOg good quality stewing 
beef, 100g lard or 8 tablespoons oil, 2 
medium onions, 1 clove garlic, 2 
tetJSpoons noble sweet paprika, 2 pinches 
caraway seed, 3-4 large potatoes, 2 
medium green or yellow peppers ( ~, cap-
sicums), 2 smJZll tomatoes, salt. 
Wipe the beef carefully, then cut into 
smJZll cubes. Hetlt the lard or oil in a large 
pan and fry the finely chopped onions 
until golden brown. Sprinkle with a little 
of the paprika, add the meat and fry until 
slightly browned. Then add crushed gar-
lic, the remaining paprika and the 
caraway seed. SetJSon to taste with salt. 
Mix thoroughly together and add a little 
water. Cover with a lid and simmer, stir-
ring frequently. Add a little more water 
from time to time if necessary to prevent 
the meat from sticking. When the metlt is 
tender, add the sliced peppers, the 
tomJZtoes cut into quarters and the peeled 
and cubed potatoes. Finally, pour in 
enough water to cover well and continue 
cooking until the potato is done. Serves 
4. 
When I look at books like The Little 
Book of Hungarian Paprika my mind 
dwells more and more on what my 
Big Banana Book would look like. It 
will definitely have a yellow cover. 
The pages will peel off from the spine 
centripetally. It will have to be read in 
one day or it will go brown and 
soggy. A condensed version will be 
available, to be known as The Little 
Sugar Banana Book. I will insist that it 
be hung in bunches above the book-
shelves, and the customers will have 
to clamber up to get it But enough of 
this beckoning fruit-for the mo-
ment, anyway. In the meantime, turn 
your hand to Hungarian Red, and 
appreciate the little things which out-
last political systems. 
Penelope Cottier. 
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Going One-Up 
Hello patients, 
Itt. a well-established scientific fact 
that every long-term sexual ftlation-
ship t. based on an intense power 
struggle. The cut and thrust of this 
struggle provides the ill-important 
sexUal tension which stimulates the 
partners to sexual activity even alter 
a long day at the office and a tribe of 
fighting kids over dinner. 
Clearly, it would not be possible to 
maintain psycho-sexual activity be-
tween the sheets without this vital 
tension created by the fundamental 
power struggle at the heart of human 
relationships. However, many 
couples waste hours of precious time 
'negotiating' in an endless process of 
monitoring who is currently 'on top' 
in their dynamic struggle. This 
process of verbal negotiation and as-
sessment to see who is 'in the good 
books' can be exhausting. Basically, 
after five, ten, or fifteen years, a 
couple may get tired of discussing 
similar things over and over again. 
It is for this reason that I have 
developed the Points System at my 
clinic. It is a psycho-sexual account-
ing technique for couples who are in 
for the long haul in their relationship. 
The Points System offers a shorthand 
way of mapping the ebb and flow of 
dominance and submission within 
the ecosystem of your partnership. 
Let me illustrate the process with an 
example. The single greatest source 
of tension for most couples is work. 
Any job is bad enough in this respect 
but when both members of the couple 
are employed in jobs which offer a 
sense of meaning and purpose, as 
well as money, then you really get 
problems. The trouble arises because 
these people both actually want to 
work longer hours. 
They want to go to public meetings 
at night. They want to redraft vital 
documents on weekends. The list is 
endless and I'm sure most of you can 
add to it from your own experience. 
If ideas about social justice can be 
squeezed into your job description, 
then you've entered a big black hole 
that can swallow hours of your life. 
Many couples have spent years bat-
tling over this issue. Quite simply, 
work interferes with child rearing, 
shopping, washing, vacuuming, dog 
walking, car servicing, holiday 
taking, sex and fun (to name just a 
few fundamental activities). As one 
of my patients always says "Relation-
ships are an activity that you do 
together. But how can we do anything 
when she is always at work?" 
My Points System saved this patient's 
intimate encounter with a significant 
other (or, as we used to say, his mar-
riage). Instead of wasting precious 
hours in recriminations and negotia-
tions over who had to do what, all 
caused by extra hours spent at work, 
they simply began to award and 
deduct points. 
If you stay at work until8 pm,leaving 
your partner to cook the dinner and 
feed the dogs, then you lose points 
and you have to make them up in 
some other way. You may bring tea 
and toast on a tray the next morning, 
or go to the supermarket alone the 
next weekend. You don't have to 
renegotiate old ground. You simply 
know where you stand in numerical 
terms. 
The really big advantage of this sys-
tem is that the best way to make up 
lost points is to do something really 
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nice that will give the other person 
pleasure. When the Points System is 
really working you stop nagging at 
each other and actually do nice things 
together. 
Of course, the more heinous the 
crime, the more points you lose, and 
the more you have to do to retain 
ground in the 1edger of life'. I know 
one chap who is the human 
equivalent of the Mexican economy. 
His partner is an independent 
feminist with her own substantial in· 
come who had a baby to please him. 
He then got a job he really wanted 
interstate and left her for three 
months with a bottle in one hand, a 
nappy in the other, and a very sad 
look on her face. 
Quite simply, this man's points 
ledger makes the Australian balana! 
of payments look good. To regain lost 
ground he is looking at perhaps a 
surprise bip to Venice with quality 
child care arranged in Italy, or offer· 
ing to stay at home full-time for three 
months on his return. 
The only way someone could lose 
more points than this chap is by com-
mitting adultery. Now I know some 
of the readers of this magazine may 
take exception to the use of the word 
'adultery'. You filled your minda 
with so much poppycock about 'opeD 
relationships' in the 70s and you still 
don't like to call a spade a spade. 
ButGoddidn'tmincewordswhenhe 
sent his bureaucrat Moses up to the 
top of that mountain to get the uJ. 
timate policy document. He wrote 
that Ten Point Mission Statement Oil 
stone so that fast-talking lobbyists 
wouldn't be able to water it down. 
Whether you like it or not, if you 
commit adultery, you'll be making up 
points for years to come. But if that 
means taking your partner on really 
exciting foreign holidays for a 
decade, at least the process of 
reconstruction can be pleasurable. 
Send your problems to Dr 
H11rtman's secrettuy, Julie 
McCrossin, Cl- ALR. 
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